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Resumo
Gerações anteriores consideraram as elites de Portugal e do Brasil como seguidores das idéias britânicas de livre comércio. Um 
olhar mais atento às finanças públicas desses países revela que, apesar de toda a retórica do livre comércio, os dois países mostra-
ram-se entre os mais protecionistas de seu tempo. As elites conduziram políticas monetárias independentes, muitas vezes fugindo da 
ortodoxia. Finalmente, as elites de ambos os países aproveitaram as oportunidades oferecidas pelo sistema financeiro internacional.
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Abstract
Previous generations considered the elites of Portugal and Brazil as dupes of British free trade ideas. A closer look at the public 
finances of these countries reveals that, for all the free trade rhetoric, both countries proved to be amongst the most protectionist 
of their time. The elites conducted independent monetary policies, often flying in the face of orthodoxy. Finally, the elites of both 
countries took advantage of the opportunities provided by the international financial system.
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For those who have lived through mi-
litary dictatorship and cold war, de-
pendence is an emotional issue. Each 
period of time must of course be analyzed on its 
own merits. In the “Age of Imperialism” (1850-
1914), subject of this paper, there were various 
truly imperialist regimes. Britain proved a cruel 
master to nearby Ireland and far away India. 
Both countries experienced their worst famines 
of all time under British rule. And the English 
were no more enlightened in their treatment of 
Africans than were the other colonial powers on 
that continent. Although Brazil and Portugal are 
customarily included in Britain´s informal empi-
re, British influence upon the elites of these two 
countries was in fact quite circumscribed.
As the First World War destroyed many 
things, including the gold standard, 1914 is an 
obvious break point. 1850 perhaps should be 
explained. This year, the European elites shook 
off the shock of the Revolutions of 1848 and be-
gan to look at economic growth as a means to 
avoid social convulsion as well an opportunity 
to further enrich themselves. The well-read Bra-
zilian elite followed the European revolutions 
with considerable interest. Brazil´s finance mi-
nister in 1848 boasted that his country was safer 
than Europe.1 The English and Portuguese elites 
watched the events of 1848 with considerable 
apprehension, the Portuguese having suppres-
sed their most important social uprising of the 
century during the previous year.  On a more 
positive note, England celebrated its famous 
World Exposition in 1851 which demonstrated 
its industrial accomplishments. With many of 
its railroads already in place, the country stood 
ready to export capital in unprecedented amounts 
while the recent discoveries of gold in the US 
and Australia provided the world financial sys-
tem with unusual liquidity.  The year 1850 found 
England with its tariffs and banking system rear-
ranged. Free trade, envisaged by Adam Smith 
in 1776, became a reality with the repeal of the 
corn laws in 1846 while the Bank Charter Act of 
1844 made the Bank of England the sole issuer 
of new banknotes, reaffirmed gold backing for 
these banknotes, and confirmed the Bank´s de 
facto lender of last resort functions. Three years 
later, with a bill of indemnity from the govern-
ment permitting it to temporarily exceed its issue 
limits, the Bank successfully acted as a lender of 
last resort during a major crisis. 
Turning to Brazil, 1850 marked a major 
turning point with the abolition of the slave tra-
de. Aggressive British naval action played a sig-
nificant part in forcing the elite to end the traffic 
after over twenty years of unkept promises (Be-
thell, 1970). Britain´s only physical intervention 
in the politics of independent Brazil consisted of 
sending frigates into Guanabara Bay to capture 
slavers. The end of the slave trade allowed the 
considerable capital thus employed to migrate 
to other parts of the economy provoking a boom 
in urban real estate, government bonds, stocks, 
foreign exchange, and coffee farms. While sla-
ves represented one third of imports in the five 
years before the abolition of the trade, the end 
of the traffic turned Brazil´s commercial deficit 
into a surplus. The year 1850 witnessed indepen-
dent Brazil´s first commercial code and first land 
law. As in the case of England, there were also 
several critical actions taken during the years 
prior to 1850. In 1844, Brazil significantly rai-
sed import tariffs following the expiration of the 
commercial treaty with Britain the first emperor 
signed, under duress, to win English and Portu-
guese recognition of Independence. Never again 
did England successfully interfere with Brazilian 
tariffs. In 1846, the government lowered the offi-
cial gold content of the Brazilian currency to the 
level where it had traded for the past 20 years in 
an attempt to move towards participation in the 
F
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gold standard. Last, but certainly not least, the 
army overcame the final local uprising in 1849. 
From this point to the fall of the Empire in 1889, 
Brazil enjoyed internal peace --after almost 30 
years of foreign wars, coups, and civil wars.
Like Brazil, Portugal had a difficult time 
from 1820 to 1850. In fact, Portugal´s troubles 
started in 1807 when Napoleon invaded the 
country. Conveyed by the Royal Navy, the Por-
tuguese court moved to Brazil where it opened 
the colony´s trade to all friendly shipping. This 
decision cost continental Portugal a significant 
portion of its tariff revenues. After Portugal re-
gained its Independence from Napoleon, King 
João VI remained in Brazil which he raised to 
the status of equal kingdom. In 1820, a Liberal 
and military revolt attempted to re-colonize Bra-
zil and forced the king to return to Europe. Whi-
le provoking Brazilian Independence, this revolt 
set off a series of coups and civil wars in Portu-
gal that ended with the coup of the Regeneration 
in 1851. From this moment until the dictatorship 
installed by King Carlos in 1907, Portugal expe-
rienced but one minor coup. Like Brazil, but sli-
ghtly earlier, 1837-´42, Portugal raised its tariffs 
after the expiration of its trade treaty with Bri-
tain. Finally, 1850 proved important to Portugal 
due to the abolition of the slave trade in Brazil. 
Although the Portuguese colonies continued sen-
ding slaves to Cuba for another 20 years, Brazil 
was clearly Angola´s and Mozambique´s largest 
market. The negative effects of the abolition of 
the trade upon Portugal were attenuated by the 
fact that most of the profits anyway appear to 
have remained with the slavers resident in Brazil 
while several former traders returned to Portugal 
from Brazil after this event bringing their capital 
home with them.
The paragraphs above demonstrate the 
similarities in the experiences of Portugal and 
Brazil as well as the economic links between 
the two countries. The first British banks outsi-
de Britain´s formal empire were established in 
the future colony of Egypt and then in Brazil, in 
1863 (Jones, 1993). The London and Brazilian 
Bank quickly opened branches in Lisbon and 
Porto to take advantage of the money flows from 
immigrant’s resident in Brazil. Immigrants´ re-
mittances remained a significant income for 
Portugal throughout this period as well as a 
considerable debit to Brazil´s balance of pay-
ments. Portuguese merchants comprised a large 
share of the commercial community in Brazil, 
a phenomenon easy to observe but difficult to 
quantify. As many of the most successful mer-
chants did not return to Portugal, at what point 
did their contemporaries begin to see them as 
Brazilians? Intermarriage with the landholding 
and political elite was not difficult. Eugene Ri-
dings noted (Ridings, 1994, page 33) that the 
Portuguese were the most numerous, though not 
the wealthiest, group of foreigners in the various 
Commercial Associations in Brazil during the 
nineteenth century. He gives the number of di-
rectors of the Commercial Association of Rio de 
Janeiro in 1877, when British influence had pas-
sed its peak and suffered increasing competition 
from Germany, France, and the US, as follows: 
Brazilians 3, British, Portuguese, and French, 2 
each, Germans, Americans, Austro-Hungarians, 
Italians, Spaniards, Belgians, 1 each, and 1 each 
to be divided between Sweden and Denmark-
-Norway and Argentina and Uruguay. We still 
need to quantify how much money flowed from 
large numbers of less fortunate Portuguese im-
migrants and how much flowed from the largest 
Lusitanian merchants. 
In 1850, Britain ranked first by a con-
siderable distance as creditor to both countries, 
ranked first as trading partner with Portugal, and 
numbered among the two largest trading partners 
of Brazil.
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 To evaluate dependence, we propose to 
consider four areas: physical intervention, trade 
(tariffs and exchange), credit, and technology. 
Political obstacles to the transfer of technology 
existed during the Middle Ages and the Early 
Modern Period, and these obstacles have retur-
ned during the Contemporary Period; during the 
years under study, technology transfer does not 
appear to have been an issue. Physical interven-
tion in Brazil by British forces did not exist after 
the abolition of the slave trade. Although Britain 
subsequently pressured the Brazilian authorities 
to recognize the freedom of slaves imported ille-
gally after 1831, a process which culminated in 
a rupture of diplomatic relations briefly in 1863, 
the British never contemplated extra-diplomatic 
measures. In the case of Portugal, Britain inter-
vened in 1847, unwillingly and at the insisten-
ce of the Portuguese government, together with 
France and Spain (Bonifacio, 1993). Britain 
would have used armed force in Africa in 1890 
had the Portuguese government not accepted 
the British ultimatum. More of this event in its 
chronological place below. The rest of this paper 
shall focus on trade and credit. 
We shall divide this analysis in two broad 
periods. The first of these cover years of con-
tinued political peace and sustained economic 
growth beginning in 1850, passing through seve-
ral world crises, and terminating in Brazil with a 
political and financial crisis caused by abolition 
in 1888. In Portugal, a crisis became apparent in 
1890 with the British ultimatum mentioned abo-
ve combined with collapse of immigrants´ re-
mittances from Brazil and the embarrassment of 
Portugal´s bankers, Barings. Both countries ex-
perienced over a decade of continuous financial/
political turmoil. Brazil came out of the crisis in 
1901 as it resumed the payment of its internatio-
nal debt while embarking upon another period of 
intense agricultural and industrial development. 
Portugal attenuated its financial crisis by rea-
ching an agreement with its international credi-
tors in 1902 and experienced some growth in the 
years prior to the First World War. Political peace 
did not return as the country experienced conti-
nuous unrest, a dictatorship in 1907, regicide in 
1908, the proclamation of a Republic in 1910, 
and years of continued turbulence thereafter. 
We shall focus on the periods of improvement, 
1850-1890, and crisis, 1890-1902 with brief 
mention of the post-crisis period, 1902-1914 as 
an epilogue.
Brazil, 1850-1888 
The Brazilian elite of this period was 
composed of coffee planters, sugar mill owners, 
ranchers and planters that supplied the exporting 
plantations as well as the cities with foodstuffs, 
merchants, officials, and professionals. All the-
se groups took for granted that the state served 
them and not the mass of the population and that 
slavery was essential to the process of produc-
tion. During the 1850s and 1860s, only the most 
forward-looking leaders of the elite imagined 
abolition within 20 years; their opponents thou-
ght slavery to be eternal. Another given for the 
elite was that public income depended on tariffs; 
coffee and sugar planters even consented to an 
export tariff on their commodities. Tariffs gene-
rally provided 60 to 70% of imperial government 
revenues during this period. And import tariffs 
were high by European standards generally ave-
raging at least 30% (Luz, 1961). Historians of 
an earlier generation accused the elite of blindly 
accepting free trade and the gold tariff to the 
detriment of industrial growth (Werneck Sodré, 
2004, pages 294-95). This view is incorrect on 
three levels: first the planters and their allies did 
what they understood to be in their own best in-
terests and proposed actions that helped them ac-
cess international markets, so they were no one´s 
dupe, second, their revenue tariffs provided local 
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industry with substantial protection regardless 
of speeches in favor of free trade, and third, the 
Brazilian elite adapted the rules of the gold stan-
dard to suit their own convenience. 
Although the Portuguese monarchy pro-
hibited manufactures in Brazil during the co-
lony, in fact some industries appeared in Minas 
to clothe slaves in situations where the cost of 
transporting imports from the coast proved too 
expensive. Upon arriving in Brazil, João VI en-
couraged the establishment of factories granting 
bounties and other favors. Perhaps we should 
consider him the father of Brazilian industry. 
Due to lack of scale as well as British competi-
tion, few early industries survived. Authors like 
Werneck Sodré (Sodré, 2004, page284) and Caio 
Prado (Prado, 1956, pages 174-176) recognized 
that the age of free trade ended with the Alves 
Branco Tariff of 1844 that generally doubled 
tariffs to some 30%. The abolition of the slave 
trade released resources which could have been 
employed in manufacturing had there existed 
genuine opportunities. In fact, industrialization 
really took off only around 1880. Although tariff 
levels continued at the high levels Alves Branco 
put in place, scale for textiles, processed foods, 
beverages, and building materials began during 
the 1880s caused by the increase of demand from 
immigrants (Dean, 1969). A secondary stimulant 
present at this moment was the passage of a law 
in 1882 that facilitated the establishment of limi-
ted liability corporations. (Similar laws passed in 
Britain in 1858 and in Portugal in 1867, by way 
of comparison.)  To conclude, from the 1850s 
through the 1870s, Brazil had high revenue tari-
ffs, improving transportation, and increasing lo-
cal capital, but little industrialization took place 
for lack of a market. Without a shift in the elite´s 
outlook towards industry, this situation began to 
change in the 1880s due first to a surge in immi-
gration and then to abolition which incorporated, 
albeit at very modest levels, some of the freed-
men into the monetary economy.
In her groundbreaking study of fifty 
years ago, Nicia Vilela Luz (Luz, 1961) demons-
trates that the governments of the empire never 
promoted tariff increases for the sake of protec-
tion. Only in the 1880s did machinery imports 
become significant (Graham, 1972, pages 331-
332). This decade saw industrialists achieving 
some prominence in the commercial associations 
while attempting, unsuccessfully, to establish 
an organization of their own (Ridings, 1994, 
pages 45-46). If we cannot praise the imperial 
elite for a conscious industrialization policy, we 
also cannot condemn them for not improving the 
economy. The 1850s saw the commencement 
of railroad construction in Brazil. By the early 
1870s, rails tied São Paulo´s hinterland to its port 
of Santos and São Paulo city to the imperial ca-
pital. Government loan guarantees proved funda-
mental for rail construction, and the authorities 
nationalized the Dom Pedro II railway from Rio 
to São Paulo. Rail construction became highly 
controversial as many members of the elite thou-
ght that several tracks would only lose money. 
These critics often proved correct. Of course, the 
lines in São Paulo made healthy returns for their 
investors. The imperial elite also funded telegra-
phs and the transatlantic cable. 
The Brazilian elite closely followed eco-
nomic developments in Europe and the United 
States. Many members of this elite demonstra-
ted considerable economic nationalism and con-
ducted well informed debates on how to deve-
lop their economy. Politicians recognized that 
industrialization had not only benefits but also 
costs in terms of higher prices and lower quality. 
The participants recognized that heavy industry 
could not acquire scale in Brazil while not even 
every light industry could expect to do so. As 
Luz demonstrates (Luz, 1961, pages 34-35), the 
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viscounts of Itaboraí and Souza Franco, leading 
spokesmen, from the late 1840s to their deaths in 
the early 1870s, respectively, of the conservative 
Saquaremas and the liberal current of the elite, 
both acknowledged the need for industrializing 
over time, both recognized the primacy of agri-
culture, and both saw revenue tariffs as necessa-
ry for financing the state. In short, Souza Fran-
co proved somewhat, although only somewhat, 
more pro-industry than Itaboraí. 
While few members of the elite became 
industrialists prior to abolition, the elite divided 
between a group devoted to the preservation of 
slave agriculture and another who envisaged 
a growing economy paced by the immigration 
of Europeans, the expansion of both small far-
ms and large plantations, the development of 
railroads and other infrastructure, the encoura-
gement of a banking system spread all over the 
provinces, and to a lesser degree, to the growth 
of industry and education. From 1848 to 1862, 
with one brief interruption, the Saquarema slavo-
crats controlled the government. In fairness, they 
abolished the slave trade (under duress), created 
the first land law (to favor large landowners), 
and the first (restrictive) commercial code. Their 
hardest fight against the more progressive forces 
took place on the issue of banking regulations. 
After the world crisis of 1837, which had 
a traumatic, if short, impact upon the merchants 
of Rio de Janeiro, a group of the larger traders es-
tablished Brazil´s first bank since the demise of 
the Banco do Brasil in 1829. This Banco Comer-
cial do Rio de Janeiro suffered relatively little go-
vernment influence and could not issue bankno-
tes although it issued “vales”, a short-term debt 
instrument.  During the next decade, one bank 
opened each in Belem, São Luís, Recife, and Sal-
vador. In 1851, during the boom following the 
abolition of the slave trade, the future viscount of 
Mauá, already one of Brazil´s leading business-
men, opened the second Banco do Brasil. Capita-
lized at twice the size of the Banco Comercial do 
Rio de Janeiro, the new bank competed directly 
with the older one. The Saquaremas, led by the 
finance minister viscount of Itaboraí, did not ap-
prove of independent banks. A year after the or-
ganization of Mauá´s bank, the finance minister 
ordered the merger of the Banco Comercial with 
the Banco do Brasil and effectively placed the 
new entity under government control by nomi-
nating the president and vice president. Although 
the surviving Banco do Brasil continued private-
ly owned, the government effectively dominated 
the decision-making process. An extreme centra-
list, Itaboraí forced the other four regional banks 
to become branches of the Banco do Brasil. Bra-
zil then had but one bank. Anyone hostile to the 
government would have difficulty obtaining a 
bank loan anywhere in Brazil. 
Itaboraí considered himself an orthodox 
follower of the gold standard. He wanted to reti-
re the paper money the government had outstan-
ding (originally placed in circulation to replace 
the banknotes of the first Banco do Brasil that 
failed in 1829) and substitute these with gold-
-backed banknotes issued by the new Banco do 
Brasil. A well-informed man, he knew that the 
Bank Charter Act of 1844 required the Bank of 
England to issue banknotes 100% backed by 
gold (above the original L14,000,000 of notes 
backed by the government debt).  He also knew 
that the British commercial banks tried to main-
tain cash and funds at call equal to one third of 
their liabilities including deposits. Combining 
the two notions, he granted the new Banco do 
Brasil the right first to issue banknotes equal to 
the double of its capital (paid into the bank in 
the form of gold and government paper money) 
and then enhanced this privilege to the triple. A 
contemporary English banker would have con-
sidered this practice as wildly inflationary yet 
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Itaboraí maintained his reputation for sound-
ness. When Itaboraí left the ministry of finance 
in 1853, his successor appointed him president 
of the Banco do Brasil. By 1857, his bank had 
doubled the circulating medium of Brazil while 
the exchange hovered around par.
In May of 1857, the emperor decided to 
call a more progressive government for the first 
time since 1848. The new finance minister, the 
future viscount of Souza Franco, represented the 
sector of the elite that favored decentralization, 
including regional banks of issue, immigration 
of Europeans, gradual emancipation, railroad 
construction, and with less enthusiasm, industry 
and education (Schulz, 2013a). Souza Franco 
participated in the organization of Brazil´s first 
four railroads and issued Brazil´s first interna-
tional railroad bond to finance the Dom Pedro II 
from the capital to São Paulo. His other imme-
diate initiative was to permit the organization of 
five new banks of issue, one each in Rio, Porto 
Alegre, Salvador, Recife, and São Luís, and the 
transformation of an existing bank in Rio into a 
bank of issue. These banks had more stringent 
limits for banknote issue than those set by Ita-
boraí for the Banco do Brasil; they could issue 
up to one time their capital backed 100% by go-
vernment debt or certain other securities. Souza 
Franco sought to maintain the milreis at parity 
but did not oblige these banks to redeem their 
notes in gold. He allowed redemption in paper 
money. In the meantime, Mauá, who had set up 
an unincorporated banking house after being 
pushed out of the management of the Banco do 
Brasil by Itaboraí, received from Souza Franco 
the privilege of converting this entity into a limi-
ted partnership (sociedade em comandita). The 
limited partnership emerged during the middle 
ages as an institution that gave limited partners 
(sócios comanditarios) limited liability as long 
as they did not participate in the management of 
their partnership. Only the general partners (só-
cios ostensivos) faced unlimited liability. Souza 
Franco justified this structure by reference to a 
French law of the previous year, 1856, in spite 
of the medieval origin of the limited liability 
partnership.
During Souza Franco´s tenure, these six 
banks issued a total of 14,000 contos of bank-
notes as opposed to 40,000 contos issued by the 
Banco do Brasil since 1853. As luck would have 
it, six months after assuming office, and when 
the new banks had just begun to issue banknotes, 
an international crisis hit Brazil. This crisis be-
gan, as did most others in the nineteenth century, 
in the United States. The US economy suffered 
from over-investment in railroads as well as spe-
culation in other assets. Without having a cen-
tral bank at this time, the American banks had to 
abandon the gold standard for two months. Bri-
tain, America´s greatest creditor, suffered in turn, 
curtailing lending in its other markets like Brazil. 
This reduction in credit proved a double stroke 
against the Rio business community as the US 
constituted Brazil´s largest export market and di-
minished its purchases during moments of stress. 
In London, the Bank of England again acted as 
lender of last resort, saving the local market from 
a wave of bankruptcies. The Bank appeared set 
to go over its limit for banknote issue and obtai-
ned an indemnity from the government, which 
it happily did not have to use. In Brazil, Souza 
Franco permitted the Banco do Brasil to issue 
over three times its capital. The four-year-old 
bank thereafter did an excellent job as lender of 
last resort. Given the demand for gold by foreign 
merchants anxious to discharge their debts, the 
Brazilian currency fell from par, 27d, to 22.5d 
very rapidly. During the worst of the crisis, the 
government guaranteed the foreign exchange 
positions of the Banco do Brasil which sold ster-
ling to raise the milreis. Once the worst had pas-
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sed, the directors of the bank no longer wanted 
to participate in this business and declined the 
minister´s request to continue, a rare act of lack 
of cooperation.
Souza Franco turned to Mauá to sell 
sterling and maintain the milreis. This banker 
readily agreed and invested his own money 
in this project rather than relying solely on the 
government´s guarantee as the directors of the 
Banco do Brasil had. Mauá and Souza Franco 
properly assessed the market that quickly re-
bounded after the crisis, making a large profit for 
the banker and restoring parity for the minister. 
During this period, Souza Franco came under in-
tense attack from Itaboraí and his followers who 
blamed the incumbent for provoking the crisis 
with his banknote issue. In vain, Souza Franco 
pointed out that Itaboraí´s bank had issued far 
more banknotes than his banks had, that the cri-
sis originated outside Brazil, and that anyway, 
the milreis had returned to par. Itaboraí insisted 
that banknote issues be restricted to avoid future 
crises. Although a not inconsiderable part of the 
imperial elite shared Souza Franco´s views of the 
Brazilian economy, at the end of the day, the Sa-
quaremas still had a majority of this elite in 1858 
and managed to have the emperor replace Souza 
Franco with a series of ministers who concurred 
with Itaboraí. By 1860, these men had the par-
liament pass the Law of Obstacles which made 
it impossible for the banks of issue to continue. 
By this law, they were forced to redeem in gold 
banknotes originally issued against paper. Any 
fall from parity resulted in a loss for the issuing 
banks so they surrendered their issue rights. Un-
til its partial repeal in 1882, the Law of Obstacles 
applied a break to all types of corporations whi-
ch required acts of parliament to obtain limited 
liability.
After the banks of issue relinquished 
their issues, money in circulation contracted in 
Brazil compromising the liquidity of the ma-
rkets. A major domestically induced crisis almost 
took place in 1862 and did occur in 1864. Exces-
sive lending by banking houses through factors 
to Rio province coffee planters, that began to feel 
the effects of age and exhaustion of their trees, 
provoked this crisis.  Once again, the Banco do 
Brasil acted as lender of last resort and had its 
issue limit suspended. Despite rapid and ener-
getic action taken by the viscount of Caravelas, 
finance minister at the time, a good deal of weal-
th disappeared as major unincorporated banking 
houses collapsed. By the time the smoke cleared 
from this crisis, the country found itself at war 
with Paraguay in what turned out to be a long 
and expensive struggle.     
In 1866, the government named a com-
mission of three former finance ministers, pre-
cisely Itaboraí, Souza Franco, and Caravelas, to 
re-organize the Banco do Brasil. The needs of 
war forced the three men into agreement. They 
decided that the Banco do Brasil would surren-
der all its gold to the government so that the lat-
ter could meet its obligations in hard currency. 
No one hoped for a gold standard as long as the 
war continued. The three former ministers also 
resolved that the bank could no longer issue new 
notes but that its existing notes would enjoy legal 
tender status. Finally, they agreed to convert a 
large share of the bank´s loan book into a mor-
tgage portfolio. In fact, this last measure con-
verted past due short-term loans into long term 
mortgages that in practice might not be received 
in the future.
After the passage of this reform, the war 
proceeded slowly while the government, encou-
raged quietly by the emperor, discussed a time 
table for emancipation for the first time. In a 
dramatic moment which foreshadowed the coup 
d’état of 1889, the Saquaremas utilized a threat 
to resign by the duke of Caxias, the Brazilian 
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commander in chief, to oust this progressive mi-
nistry replacing it with one presided by Itaboraí. 
After silencing all talk of abolition, Itaboraí saw 
the war to a victorious conclusion while having 
to endure the lowest exchange of the whole em-
pire, 17d.  
Once the war ended, Emperor Pedro II 
relieved Itaboraí of office. The monarch forged a 
coalition that passed the Law of the Free Womb, 
in 1871, which declared all children of slaves 
born after this date as free.  This legislation has 
been viewed by some as a major concession by 
the slave owners acknowledging that servitude 
would come to an end while others see it as a 
cynical maneuver to preserve slavery for another 
generation. The truth must be somewhere in the 
middle, a compromise possible at that moment. 
With peace and with prosperity in the world, 
Brazil appeared to recover quickly from the war 
as the milreis returned to parity. While at war, 
the world crisis of 1866 had barely affected Bra-
zil, and when a new international crisis began in 
May of 1873, this one too seemed to pass Brazil 
by. In September, the crisis, that began in Cen-
tral Europe, reached the United States, Brazil´s 
largest market, and still no impact on Brazil. 
Finally, in May of 1875, a week after the dea-
th of his friend and defender, Senator and Cou-
ncilor of State Souza Franco, Mauá suspended 
payments. Prime minister and finance minister 
viscount of Rio Branco reacted energetically to 
this new crisis. As the Banco do Brasil had been 
prohibited by the law of 1866 from issuing new 
banknotes, Rio Branco supplied liquidity by len-
ding the bank the paper money the government 
had on hand. This action once again made the 
Banco do Brasil into a lender of last resort that 
saved many firms from going under, although 
Mauá and three incorporated banks eventually 
went into liquidation.
1875 proved to be the empire´s last fi-
nancial panic, but it inaugurated a decade of re-
cession in the coffee market forcing the milreis 
down from its parity of 27d to 20d, almost as low 
as during the Paraguayan War. During the coffee 
recession, São Paulo and southern Minas conti-
nued to increase their production while that of 
Rio province accelerated its decline. In 1880, a 
vigorous abolitionist campaign began supported 
by residents of the cities. In 1884, seeing the han-
dwriting on the wall, the Banco do Brasil refused 
to accept slaves as collateral for loans. In the fu-
ture, planters would have to offer in guarantee 
either their land, which often was difficult due 
to unclear titles, or crops on the trees. The de-
preciation of the Brazilian currency served well 
the planters who followed the Saquarema leader-
ship. With the decline of the milreis, they recei-
ved more local currency for their coffee exports. 
When coffee exports and the exchange recove-
red in 1887, finance minister Francisco Belisario 
Soares de Souza, nephew of Itaboraí´s  Saquare-
ma colleague, the viscount of Uruguai, suggested 
lowering parity so the coffee planters would not 
lose their income in local currency.2 The Sa-
quarema dedication to gold went only so far. By 
1887, the world of the Saquaremas was turning 
upside down. Through death and manumission, 
the number of slaves had declined to the point 
that servile labor could no longer man the ex-
panding coffee plantations of São Paulo. Drou-
ght in the Northeast, making free labor cheaper 
than slaves, combined with the sale of slaves to 
São Paulo to undermine the Northeastern com-
mitment to slavery. That year, leaders from São 
Paulo and the Northeast abandoned the last sla-
veocrat ministry, that of the baron of Cotegipe 
where Belisario continued as finance minister. 
Months later, Cotegipe was out and abolition 
passed in parliament. With coffee prices at cycli-
cal highs, the milreis at parity, and immigrants 
swarming in, the fears generated among the elite 
by abolition disappeared. Except for the coffee 
24 História e Economia Revista Interdisciplinar 
planters of Rio, with their old, uncompetitive 
trees, the remainder of the elite, including the 
planters of São Paulo and Minas, reached a state 
of euphoria. But the coffee planters of Rio could 
still make themselves heard. Although the gover-
nment denied the Rio planters an indemnity for 
the loss of their slaves, the last two monarchist 
ministries tried to provide them with debt relief 
through easy loans.  
From the currency reform of 1846 to 
abolition, Brazil had the gold standard as an 
ideal. For years, the milreis hovered around pa-
rity and even traded above this level during pe-
riods of high coffee prices. On the other hand, 
during the Paraguayan War and again during the 
late seventies and early eighties, the milreis mo-
ved well below parity only to recover once more 
around abolition. Not being on the gold standard 
benefitted planters. Being close to the gold stan-
dard helped pay the international debt, to which 
we turn next.
Brazil´s international debt began in 
1825 when Emperor Pedro I assumed part of the 
Portuguese debt to Britain as the price for the 
recognition of Independence by Portugal and 
Britain. During the difficult years that followed, 
Brazil had to borrow to pay interest but always 
serviced its debt.  
After 1850, as we have seen, the 
country´s fortunes improved. The Rothschilds, 
who participated in several of the earlier 
issues, consolidated their position as Brazil´s 
lead bankers with the loan of 1852 and their 
appointment as exclusive agent in 1855. This 
house underwrote all the facilities for the central 
government until 1906. In addition to direct 
loans, the government guaranteed funds taken 
by railroad companies. The railroad loans were 
contingent liabilities; when rail profits generated 
dividends of, usually, 7%, the government did 
not have to pay. Many of the lines failed to 
produce profits while the São Paulo Railway 
always did. By the end of the Empire, annual 
disbursements of railroad guarantees came to 
L800,000 compared to interest on international 
government debt of L1,900,000 and immigrants´ 
remittances of L3,000,000. 
Local debt, called apolices, payable in 
milreis rather than sterling, modelled itself on 
the British consols. As such, these instruments, 
by 1850, had evolved into perpetuals yielding 
interest, generally 6% per annum, but no 
amortization. Apolices immediately became 
popular with a wide cross-section of the elite 
including planters, merchants, officials, and 
professionals as well as their spouses and 
widows. When the decline of the milreis during 
the Paraguayan War made foreign debt more 
onerous and less forthcoming, the government 
accelerated the issue of apólices. To make these 
instruments more attractive, the government 
issued special national loans with interest paid 
in gold, at 5% rather than the customary 6% in 
milreis (Summerhill, 2015).
After the war, international borrowing 
became progressively less expensive while 
internal demand for apólices grew. Indebted 
planters complained that potential creditors 
preferred apólices to loans. As apólices traded 
consistently over par, the government proved 
able, in 1886, to reduce the interest rate to 5% 
by threatening to prepay existing apólices. The 
conversion economized funds for the treasury but 
did not increase credit for the Rio coffee planters 
because potential lenders considered them an 
unsatisfactory credit risk. The cries of the Rio 
planters also induced the Saquarema ministry 
of Cotegipe, 1885-1888, to substitute domestic 
debt for foreign in a move to diminish the supply 
of apólices. The recovery of the coffee market 
after 1885, allied with the country´s excellent 
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payment record, led to a great improvement 
of terms: Cotegipe and Belisario took an 
international loan of L6,000,000 for 38 years at a 
coupon of 5% and a discount of only 5%, a cost 
which compared favorably with those of many 
European states.
Contemporaries sensed what we would 
call “crowding out” by the government of 
the private sector, in this case the Rio coffee 
planters. Successive governments took the twin 
measures of reducing the interest on apólices 
and issuing more foreign debt to avoid crowding. 
Back in 1866, with the support of both Itaboraí 
and Souza Franco, the government created a 
mortgage portfolio in the Banco do Brasil that, 
in theory, would make it easier for planters to 
borrow long term at reasonable rates.  On that 
occasion, the directors formed this portfolio by 
exchanging largely past due advances, originally 
made to the banking houses that collapsed 
during the crisis of 1864, into mortgages on the 
properties of the planters who were the ultimate 
recipients of these credits, often through their 
factors (comissários). In the following years, 
the bank´s collection experiences turned out 
to be unfavorable, and in 1887, it terminated 
this portfolio. The mortgage law itself did not 
properly defend creditors as it stipulated that 
loans could not exceed half of the hypothecated 
property. As a result, there were cases of debtors 
suing their creditors to take their properties 
against payment to the debtors of the other half! 
Although the declining Rio planters obtained a 
terrible reputation as deadbeats, more prosperous 
planters in other regions like São Paulo and the 
south of Minas Gerais provided their creditors 
with a more satisfactory experience. Recent 
research by Rita Almico (Almico, 2015), Renato 
Marcondes (Marcondes, 1998), and Anderson 
Pires (Pires, 2009), among others, covering the 
rising areas of São Paulo and Minas, has caused 
a major reappraisal in the role of the mortgage 
as a credit instrument during the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Often the creditors 
were local capitalists lending in their own names. 
Formal bank credit took time to reach the interior 
of the country, but credit by private individuals, 
relying on mortgages, and credit by factors on 
the security of future coffee sales, went a long 
way to satisfying the needs of those planters that 
managed viable properties. 
To conclude, Brazil achieved abolition, 
an event that many had thought impossible a 
generation before, without major violence or 
disruption of the economy. The availability of 
European and potential oriental immigrants 
played a major role in the timing of abolition, but 
external pressure, even of the moral sort, proved 
to be of minor importance (Rocha, 2008) in the 
passage of emancipation. Throughout the period 
from the abolition of the slave trade to abolition, 
the Brazilian elite had maintained prudent 
financial administration that gave the state ample 
access to both international and domestic credit 
markets as well as an exchange rate that had 
periodically returned to parity. High revenue 
tariffs provided local industry with a degree of 
protection while the emergence of a domestic 
market comprised of salaried immigrants and, to 
a lesser extent, freedmen, had produced by 1888 
the beginnings of national light industry. The 
independence of the Brazilian elite during this 
period appears clear.
In order to placate the declining Rio 
coffee planters, the last two prime ministers of 
the Empire and especially the first governments 
of the Republic abandoned this prudence with 
dire results. Before discussing this departure 
from prudent finance, let us turn to the Portuguese 
experience.
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Portugal, 1851-1890
The current consensus among Portuguese 
historians (Reis, 1993, Lains, 1995) is that 
Portugal found itself further behind the most 
advanced economies in 1914 than it had been in 
1850. Stephen Haber (Haber, 1997) suggests the 
same for Brazil. In one sense, Haber is correct in 
that the United States growth exceeded that of 
Brazil at that time. On the other hand, if we take 
the dynamic Central and Southern parts of Brazil 
by themselves, we may find a rate of expansion 
like that of the United States, while of course 
the economy of the Northeast failed to grow or 
even shrank. In the case of the dynamic areas of 
Brazil, especially São Paulo, Rio city, Southern 
Minas, and Rio Grande do Sul, contemporaries 
sensed a great expansion throughout this entire 
period. There were moments of euphoria, during 
the 1850s, after abolition, and again during 
the first decade of the twentieth century. To 
overlook this optimism would make it difficult 
to understand the “age of improvements”. For 
its part, all of Europe, in a wave going from 
northwest to southeast, became enthralled with 
this age of improvements. Despite not being able 
to participate in the material progress to the same 
degree as other small economies did, Portugal 
still experienced a feeling of exhilaration with 
the opening of its railroads, bridges, ports, and 
telephone service. Although the period 1890-
1914 proved particularly difficult for Portugal, 
this country did benefit visibly from the 
improvements of the age up to 1890. For all its 
shortcomings, the “Regeneração” was precisely 
a regeneration.
Turning to industry in Portugal, today 
there exists a consensus that protection during 
this period was high, in fact even higher than in 
the United States, the quintessential high tariff 
country (Reis, 1993, page 16). The Portuguese 
elite, like its Brazilian equivalent, was not a 
dupe of the free trade arguments made by British 
economists. If anything, Portuguese development 
may have been retarded by excessive tariffs that 
removed the incentives for Portuguese firms 
to modernize themselves3.  For the public 
finances, import tariffs turned out to be slightly 
less important than their Brazilian equivalents, 
amounting to slightly less than half of state 
revenues compared to a range of 60 to 70% for 
Brazil. In any case, the tariffs constituted a major 
source of state income although the state did use 
the tariffs to protect industry and, unlike Brazil, 
to protect agriculture as well.
As Portugal had an industry in the 
eighteenth century (Madureira, 1997), industrial 
interest groups already functioned in Portugal 
in 1850. State protection for industry had a 
tradition in this country beginning with the count 
of Ericeira, an almost contemporary of Colbert 
in the seventeenth century, running through the 
marquess of Pombal in the eighteenth, to various 
governments of the nineteenth century, including 
the Setembrists of 1837, who imposed the first 
protective tariff after the British occupation. 
In fact, protective tariffs proved a constant 
after 1837, free trade rhetoric to the contrary 
notwithstanding. Due to adequate protection, 
the restoration of peace, and a favorable world 
economy, Portuguese industry began to grow 
in the decade before 1850 and continued at a 
respectable if not spectacular pace until the First 
World War (Lains, 1995, page 60).
While both Portugal and Brazil depended 
upon England as their chief supplier of external 
funds, Portugal saw Britain as her principal 
market for wine while Brazil had a different 
buyer for coffee: The United States. One must 
remember that the United States remained a 
large debtor economy until the very end of the 
nineteenth century, competing with Brazil and 
Portugal for British loans until the Boer War, 
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1899-1902, when J P Morgan appeared as a 
creditor to Britain. While Brazil “effortlessly” 
diversified its markets as new areas like Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and Italy became major 
consumers of coffee at the end of the century, 
Portugal had more difficulty in identifying its 
market for wine as England imported more 
from the competition. Clearly England used its 
importance as a customer to negotiate the best 
possible trade treaty with Portugal; Britain did 
not have this position of strength in bargaining 
with Brazil.
As Portugal practiced protection 
while several of its leaders praised free 
trade, this country´s elite also demonstrated 
independence in its exchange policies and in 
its debt repayment practices. Let us turn first to 
Portugal´s experience with the metal backing 
for its currency. The war against France forced 
even England off the metallic standard in 1797. 
Banknotes, especially of the Bank of England, 
circulated at that time while gold went to an 
80% premium over paper at the worst moments 
of the Napoleonic War (Clapham, 1945, II, page 
78). When England returned to convertibility in 
1821, sterling had the same metallic value as it 
had had in 1797. The lowering of prices from 
the 80% premium caused commercial failures, 
salary reductions, depression, and social conflict. 
As many members of parliament were creditors 
of the state, they thought these inconveniences 
worth the benefits of the state paying its creditors 
the full amount owed them in metal. Borrowers, 
many merchants, and the unemployed would 
have disagreed. Portugal, without a state bank, 
issued paper money beginning in 1797 sending 
gold to a premium.  Political instability and civil 
war delayed Portugal´s return to convertibility 
until 1854. Worthy of note is that Portugal 
became the first state to follow Britain on the 
gold as opposed to the bi-metallic standard. Prior 
to suspending convertibility in 1797, England 
had reduced the legal tender status of silver to 
transactions no greater than L25. In 1821, only 
gold became legal tender thus commencing the 
era of the gold standard. Even more remarkable, 
in my opinion, is that Portugal returned to 
convertibility at a rate only slightly lower than 
the level of 1797: a milreis of 55d as compared 
to 63d in 1797. Brazil, which of course had a 
common currency with Portugal until 1822, 
adopted a milreis of 27d in 1846 and rarely 
achieved convertibility at that rate. 
Between 1797 and 1854, Portugal 
suffered the War of the Oranges with 
Spain, repeated French invasions, British 
occupation, civil war between absolutists and 
constitutionalists, several coups, and finally 
another major civil conflict. The decision to go 
on gold at 55d must have gratified the domestic 
creditors, many of whom held seats in the 
legislature. Unfortunately for the creditors, the 
same government, whose moving spirit was 
Fontes Pereira de Melo, in 1852 had unilaterally 
lowered the interest on both external and 
internal debt to 3% p.a. as well as terminating 
amortization, turning all the Portuguese debt into 
non-amortizing consols or perpetuals. As new 
debts could only be sold at over double this 3% 
yield, the “renegotiation” represented a major 
capital loss for the creditors. Brazil treated both 
its external and internal creditors in a much more 
favorable manner. In the case of external debt 
denominated in pounds sterling, the exchange 
rate did not matter to the creditors who received 
in gold. External creditors suffered no loss 
lending to Brazil until World War I disrupted the 
market. As the de facto Brazilian exchange rate 
fell during the 1820s to what would become the 
parity of 27d, domestic creditors who purchased 
apólices after this time, would have lost nothing 
by Brazil officially going on a 27d parity, which 
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continued through 1889. (After 1889, holders 
of domestic Brazilian debt suffered from the 
devaluation; in 1914, the Brazilian currency 
stood at 16d). While the holders of Portuguese 
debt lost half of their investments in real 
terms when the interest rate dropped to 3%, 
Brazil´s creditors never suffered an involuntary 
conversion and came out whole. What is most 
interesting is that, after Fontes personally went to 
London in 1855 to negotiate with Barings, both 
external and internal creditors purchased ever 
increasing amounts of Portuguese debt at ever 
more advantageous terms, even after sustaining 
this severe “hair cut”.
We do not know who really held either 
the Brazilian or the Portuguese external and 
internal debts. One may imagine that a number 
of individuals held both. Foreign, including 
Portuguese, merchants held a good deal of 
the Brazilian internal debt (Summerhill, 
2015). Brazilian landowners, politicians, and 
professionals held the rest. Foreign merchants 
resident in Brazil, along with wealthy Brazilians, 
purchased the external debt. Coupons could be 
presented in England or Brazil for payment so 
that clients of the British banks in Portugal would 
find no difficulties in receiving coupons through 
their banks. One may assume that many large 
investors in Brazil´s external obligations were 
successful Portuguese merchants who returned 
home. By the same token, Brazilians and 
Portuguese resident in Brazil held Portuguese 
debt. How much Portuguese and Brazilian 
external debt was held by British investors not 
commercially linked to these two countries is an 
interesting question waiting for future research. 
A first hypothesis is that more not commercially 
linked foreigners held Portuguese debt than held 
Brazilian debt. The Brazilian state had a harder 
time even partially repudiating its debt because 
these obligations were held by local people who 
counted politically. 
The banking system of Portugal 
developed at the same time as that of Brazil, 
with the advantage for Portugal for allowing 
regional banks of issue. Portugal´s first bank 
began later than that of Brazil. João VI organized 
a privately owned, but government controlled, 
Banco do Brasil in 1809, almost as soon as he 
arrived in Rio de Janeiro. This bank enjoyed 
a monopoly of banknote issues, financed the 
government thereby, and collapsed in 1829 due 
to the government´s inability to repay. When 
the king returned to Portugal in 1821, he took 
as much of the Banco do Brasil´s gold as he 
could and presided over the foundation of the 
Banco de Lisboa. This bank also was privately 
owned, enjoyed a monopoly of banknote issues 
in the capital, and financed the government. The 
Banco de Lisboa suffered from its inception 
under the difficulties of Portugal´s unstable 
political situation. In 1846, during the civil war, 
the government merged it with another troubled 
institution and created thereby the Banco de 
Portugal. This new institution, like the Bank 
of England, and the soon-to-be-formed second 
Banco do Brasil, was privately owned, enjoyed 
a monopoly of banknote issue in the capital, 
acted as lender of last resort, and assisted the 
government whenever necessary.  
In 1835, the Banco Commercial do Porto 
was established in that city with the privilege 
of issuing banknotes. When Portugal returned 
to convertibility in 1854, the banknotes of the 
Banco de Portugal and the Banco Commercial 
had to be exchanged for gold at sight at these 
banks. After 1854, several private note issuing 
banks established themselves in various towns of 
the Northwest of Portugal. 
Convertibility proceeded normally for 
these banks until Portugal abandoned the gold 
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standard in 1891. Unlike Brazil, Portugal only 
had one major financial crisis, that of 1876, 
in the entire period from 1854 to 1891. Of the 
major world financial crises of the nineteenth 
century, the United States was at the middle 
of the following: 1837, 1857, 1873, and 1893, 
and was certainly involved to a lesser but 
important extent in those of 1825, 1847, and 
1866. Regarding Brazil, we have noted above 
that the crises of 1837, 1857, and 1873 (this last 
crisis with a delayed effect) all upset the local 
financial markets. As Brazil depended upon 
the United States for purchasing its coffee, the 
contagion seems evident. Although Portugal did 
not export to the United States directly, it did 
export to England which felt the effects of the US 
immediately. A first hypothesis for these crises 
not spreading to Portugal is that the Portuguese 
economy appeared less dependent on the outside 
world. 
The Portuguese crisis of 1876 occurred 
in August, thus 15 months after the suspension 
of the Banco Mauá and the Brazilian crisis of 
1875, 35 months after the collapse of J Cooke in 
the United States, and 39 months after the Krach 
on the Berlin Stock Exchange which set off the 
world crisis of 1873 in the first place. Brazil 
might have something to do with the Portuguese 
crisis. Since the abolition of the slave trade, the 
volume of remittances from Brazil had become a 
significant component of the Portuguese balance 
of payments. During the Paraguayan War, 1864-
1870, the Brazilian currency fluctuated reaching a 
low of 17d. Remittances became more expensive, 
so the volume sent to Portugal contracted and the 
Portuguese economy felt this loss. When the war 
terminated, the Brazilian currency rebounded 
towards parity and remittances increased in 
tandem. The Brazilian crisis of 1875 affected the 
exchange rate and created a pessimistic mood in 
the country which would have continued as the 
prices of coffee proceeded downward. All over 
the world, deflation appeared to have settled 
in as contemporaries experienced the “Great 
Depression”, ultimately from 1873 to 1896. The 
United States in 1876 had not yet returned to the 
metallic standard that it abandoned in 1861 at the 
onset of its civil war. By 1876, the government 
was moving to return to convertibility, 
which happened in 1879, only into gold. The 
demonetization of silver as a currency caused a 
major political battle that ultimately was resolved 
only with the discovery of gold in Alaska and 
the end of the deflation after 1896. To return to 
convertibility without lowering the gold content 
of the dollar, the US authorities exacerbated the 
deflation creating bankruptcies, labor strife, and 
resentment from debtors of all types, especially 
the still numerous farmers. With this conflicted 
background, coffee prices fell and remained 
low for another decade. Portuguese residents of 
Brazil in 1876 could have foreseen a difficult 
patch ahead and decreased remittances thereby 
also creating an expectation of lower remittances 
in the future. 
Portugal´s banking bubble accompanied 
that of Germany with a lag. Germany´s began 
with the victory over Austria in 1866 that 
resulted in a virtual unification of the country 
under Prussian leadership. Many new banks 
were organized, including the Deutsche Bank, 
which continue through today. Other institutions 
lacked real capital and lived on promises rather 
than resources. The boom received more fuel 
with victory over France in 1870, the annexation 
of Alsace-Lorraine, the French indemnity, and 
the proclamation of the German Empire. By 
1873, many companies had their stock values bid 
up to impossible levels, and the inevitable Krach 
occurred. Portugal´s bubble started around 
1870. By 1873, there were 13 banks, perhaps 
an adequate number for an economy the size of 
30 História e Economia Revista Interdisciplinar 
Portugal´s. By 1876, the number had quadrupled 
to 52. The crisis was quickly overcome with 
the Banco de Portugal acting as the lender 
of last resort. Several banks failed outright 
while others merged.  Although the Banco de 
Portugal obtained a law giving it a monopoly of 
banknotes all over the country, opposition from 
the other banks of issue prevented this monopoly 
from going into effect. In 1887, a second law 
affirmed this monopoly, again without success. 
As Portugal remained on the gold standard, 
all the banks of issue had to deliver gold when 
customers presented their notes. In terms of 
banknote issue, Portugal stimulated economic 
growth outside the capital. This was the situation 
when the great crisis of 1890 struck.
During the 1880s, three events appeared 
that would affect Portugal´s future: the occupa-
tion of Africa, the exhaustion of the Regeneração 
and with it of the monarchy, and the wine glut. 
Until this decade, Africa represented nothing 
more to Portugal than a source of slaves to ex-
port. At the time of Brazil´s independence, the 
Portuguese elite feared that the Angolan elite 
would desire to form a union with Brazil. When 
the Portuguese demonstrated that, despite British 
pressure, they would not interfere with the slave 
trade, Angola remained a colony. The abolition 
of the Brazilian slave trade in 1850 eliminated 
the African colonies` major export although both 
Angola and Mozambique continued to supply 
Cuba with slaves for a further 20 years. As early 
as 1825, writers suggested that Angola could be-
come a new Brazil by planting the same tropical 
crops, especially coffee, sugar, and cotton, that 
Brazil did. While the period 1825 to 1880 wit-
nessed Brazil´s takeover of the world coffee ma-
rket as well as its continuation in the sugar and 
cotton businesses and its emergence as a supplier 
of cocoa, Angola and Mozambique languished, 
perhaps because the Portuguese could not ensla-
ve Africans on their homeland (Gervase-Smith, 
1985).
 By 1880, England had established firm 
control over the English-speaking areas of South 
Africa but only nominal power over the Dutch 
speaking provinces of Transvaal and Orange. 
Awareness of the mineral wealth of South Africa 
made the English anxious to secure the use of 
Lourenço Marques harbor in case of a conflict 
with the Boers. That year, they made a treaty 
with Portugal to assure the use of this port, and in 
so doing, provoked a strong reaction in Lisbon, 
that led to the fall of the Portuguese government.
Also by 1880, other European powers 
began to take note of Africa´s potential. That 
decade, due to the failure of Egypt and Tunisia 
to pay their external debts, England and France, 
respectively, established protectorates over these 
north African states. In the southern and central 
parts of the continent, England, France, Ger-
many, Belgium, and Italy all became interested in 
acquiring colonies. Although the German victory 
over France in 1870 had established this country 
as the most feared force on the European main-
land, England viewed France as an almost equal 
danger to the island empire´s balance of power 
strategy. England preferred Portuguese settle-
ment to that of potential rivals and, at first, defen-
ded the Portuguese claim to control the Congo 
River against Belgium. When, in 1884, it became 
apparent that King Leopold of the Belgians had 
effectively occupied the north bank of the river, 
England withdrew its support of Portugal. The 
loss of the northern side of the Congo galvanized 
the Portuguese government into an attempt to oc-
cupy as much of the territory between the coasts 
of Angola and Mozambique as possible. Here, 
Portugal´s aspirations clashed with those of her 
oldest ally which sought to consolidate its domi-
nium from newly occupied Cairo to the Cape of 
Good Hope. For Britain to maintain control from 
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Cape to Cairo, Portugal could not hold Luanda to 
Beira. At this time, Germany became a colonial 
power annexing Tanganyika, just north of Mo-
zambique, Namibia, on the southern border of 
Angola, as well as several areas of central wes-
tern Africa. Although of all the colonies men-
tioned, only Egypt and South Africa generated 
serious income for their owner, the European sta-
tes believed that the several African areas would 
prove valuable. As the decade of the 1880s came 
to a close, Portugal found itself in potential con-
flict both with England and with Germany but 
without a revenue stream from its colonies. As 
early as 1871, Eça de Queiroz suggested selling 
all or part of the African colonies to repay the 
national debt, that he felt was becoming unsus-
tainable (Monica, 2009, page 124).
Eça was far from the only observer to 
be worried about the size of the national debt. 
Prior to the 1880s, Spain, Greece, and Italy had 
serious debt problems while even Hungary, then 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, came 
close to a moratorium in 1873. Portugal´s debt 
service, almost exclusively interest, absorbed 
half of the budget, and many contemporaries, 
including the Economist expressed skepticism 
during the 1880s regarding Portugal´s ability to 
pay. The optimism of Fontes Pereira de Melo 
helped maintain the value of Portuguese securi-
ties, but his death in 1887 removed one of the 
mainstays of growth. After Fontes´s passing, 
the whole idea of the Regeneração came to be 
questioned. Yes, Portugal had railroads, but the 
elite began to feel deceived as prosperity had not 
come along with transport, and the country felt 
that it had lost ground relative to other European 
states. With the disillusion over the Regeneração 
came also a questioning of the monarchy. Fran-
ce, Portugal´s Latin model, became a Republic in 
1870 inspiring the formation of a Portuguese Re-
publican Party in 1876. Though the incumbent 
monarchist leaders could still easily control the 
outcome of parliamentary elections, the vocal 
republican party, attacking the current regime as 
corrupt, made the successive royal governments 
uncomfortable. An articulate, if small, Socialist 
Party, promoted Portugal´s first strikes and com-
peted with the Republican Party in the two cities. 
The fall of King Carlos´ Brazilian cousin, Empe-
ror Pedro II, in November 1889, added tension 
to the air.
The bright spot in Portugal´s 1880s was 
wine exports. A disease attacked French vines 
making France a major market for Portuguese 
wines, both for consumption and for re-export in 
French bottles. As British consumption of Portu-
guese wines declined, the French market became 
providential. Unfortunately, in 1887, the exports 
to France began to decline as the French vineyar-
ds recovered while imports from France´s colony 
of Algeria expanded.  
 Let us now return to the difficulties fa-
ced by the Bragança monarchy in Brazil.
Brazil, 1888-1901
Immediately after abolition, the plan-
ters of Rio demanded indemnity for their loss of 
slaves. Although the Conservative government 
led by João Alfredo Correa de Oliveira denied 
this appeal, the prime minister knew he would 
have to do something to placate this still impor-
tant group. The month of abolition, João Alfredo 
summoned a bi-partisan committee, led by the 
Conservative viscount of Cruzeiro and the Li-
beral viscount of Ouro Preto, to draft a banking 
reform that would permit the issue of banknotes. 
While this committee prepared its bill, João Al-
fredo signed agreements with two existing ins-
titutions, the Banco do Brasil and the Banco da 
Bahia, to on lend to planters the 4,300 contos Co-
tegipe had left unused in the emancipation fund. 
The banks received these funds interest free and 
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agreed to provide an equal amount from their 
own resources in order to lend the double long 
term at 6%. In fact, the banks appear to have lent 
only the funds received from the government. 
In November of 1888, the Cruzeiro-Ouro 
Preto proposal became law, and in January 1889, 
João Alfredo regulated this statute. This measu-
re appeared to look backwards to the 1850s as 
it provided for banknotes with two types of ba-
cking: government debt and gold. With govern-
ment debt, apólices or national loans, as backing, 
the new banks of issue could issue banknotes up 
to two thirds of their capital. This fraction compa-
res conservatively with the contemporary United 
States law permitting 90% of capital, and Sousa 
Franco´s rules of 1857 which permitted issues 
up to 100% of capital. The regulation on gold 
backing allowed issues as high as three times ca-
pital backed by and convertible into gold. Three 
times capital is extremely inflationary, even if 
mitigated by the need to convert the banknotes to 
gold on demand. In fact, during João Alfredo´s 
government, no bank found issues, as regulated 
in January, to be an interesting proposition.
Unsatisfied by João Alfredo, just over 
a year after abolition, the Rio planters joined 
with their Liberal opponents in parliament to 
overthrow him. Emperor Pedro II summoned 
the Liberal viscount of Ouro Preto to form a 
government at a moment when the Republican 
sentiment of many in the elite became apparent 
not to say vociferous. Limited by the emperor in 
terms of the political concessions he could make, 
particularly in regards to federalism, Ouro Preto 
concentrated his energies on financial measures 
with four major initiatives. He converted most 
of the external debt from 5% coupons into 4%s 
for 55 years, demonstrating Brazil´s standing 
in the international market, while issuing a lar-
ge domestic national loan to have cash on hand 
to help provide liquidity to the coffee planters. 
He expanded João Alfredo´s loans to the banks 
for on lending to agriculture; whereas João Al-
fredo had contracted to provide 16,000 contos 
and actually lent 4,300, Ouro Preto contracted 
172,000 (almost the size of the circulating me-
dium) and actually advanced 26,000 contos to 
no fewer than 17 banks, some which appear to 
have been organized exclusively to receive the 
state´s funds.4 The banks on lent the government 
money and came back for further resources wi-
thout releasing any funds of their own as they 
had contracted to do. Ouro Preto´s third initia-
tive removed João Alfredo´s limits to the issue 
of gold-backed banknotes. When these new ru-
les failed to elicit issues, Ouro Preto launched 
a fourth measure, the creation of the Banco 
Nacional.  This new institution, which included 
the French Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas as a 
major shareholder, had 90,000 contos of authori-
zed capital and the privilege of issuing three ti-
mes this amount backed by and convertible into 
gold. With the milreis at par, Ouro Preto thus 
attempted to go on the gold standard, giving the 
appearance of highly conservative finances. In 
fact, an issue of three times capital, a sum larger 
than the entire circulating medium, would have 
been highly inflationary and would have the im-
mediate impact of preventing the milreis trading 
over par thus guaranteeing planters more local 
currency for their exports. In the longer run, this 
convertibility had no chance of success as a fall 
in coffee exports would have quickly ended the 
possibility of redeeming banknotes in gold. Ouro 
Preto, however, focused on winning support for 
the monarchy in the short run.
Ouro Preto´s energetic measures started 
a bubble which affected the prices of stocks and 
other assets, called the Encilhamento. Like other 
bubbles, this one had real underpinnings in the 
sense of a positive coffee market combined with 
the successful abolition of slavery and the crea-
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tion of a national market of immigrants and free-
dmen. Ouro Preto´s financial measures won him 
much support from some members of the com-
mercial community of Rio as well as criticism 
from others for his use of public funds to bail out 
the Rio planters.5 As it turned out, the Rio plan-
ters abandoned the monarchy while a coalition 
ostensibly led by the military staged a successful 
coup against Pedro II on November 15, 1889. 
We have no signs of British or other foreign in-
fluence leading to this coup. On the contrary, the 
Rothschilds suspended new transactions for Bra-
zil until the Republic conducted elections while 
the British government also denied recognition 
to the Republic until the new regime proved its 
legitimacy. The Banque de Paris et de Pay Bas 
immediately cut its lines to its affiliate, the Ban-
co Nacional.  
Foreign merchants, including the subs-
tantial Portuguese community, as well as weal-
thy Brazilians, sent large amounts of money out 
of the country during the weeks that followed 
the coup, forcing the milreis down from par of 
27d to 24d in one month. The stock market boom 
of the Ouro Preto months came to a halt, while 
the coffee planters continued to clamor for more 
loans. The first finance minister of the Republic, 
Ruy Barbosa, has been among the most admired 
and most attacked figures in Brazilian history. 
The stint in the finance ministry, from Novem-
ber 1889 to January 1891, constituted his only 
experience in executive office. Hailed as a pro-
tector of Brazilian industry, one of his initial acts 
was to cancel a tariff increase promulgated by 
Ouro Preto. In December, he tried to force the 
banks of issue that had signed contracts with his 
predecessor to effect these issues. Reasonably 
the banks refused to issue notes at 24d that the 
ambiguous legislation might oblige them to re-
deem at 27d. In January, with the stock market 
paralyzed, the exchange declining, and the plan-
ters complaining, Barbosa decided to abandon 
the conservative practices of his predecessors, 
going even further than Ouro Preto had on the 
path to recklessness. On his authority and that 
of the president, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, 
without advising his colleagues in the cabinet, 
Barbosa issued a decree giving a bank to be 
organized by Francisco Mayrink, principal sha-
reholder of several other institutions, the privi-
lege of issuing banknotes up to 200,000 contos, 
the entire circulating medium of the country at 
that time.  This issue was to be backed by go-
vernment bonds. The idea of bond backing as 
practiced in the contemporary United States and 
by Souza Franco´s banks of issue made a good 
deal of sense. What bothered many within the 
elite was the astronomic size of this issue whi-
ch permitted the 200,000 contos for the central 
part of Brazil while authorizing another bank, 
yet to be established in Barbosa´s home town of 
Salvador, to issue a further 150,000 contos for 
the Northeast and North of Brazil and a third 
institution to cover Rio Grande do Sul with an 
issue limit of 100,000 contos. A public outburst 
within two weeks reduced the authorized limit of 
Mayrink´s bank´s issue to 100,000, and a second 
protest caused the three banks to be further redu-
ced in March to 50,000 each. As it turned out, by 
September, Mayrink´s bank had issued 50,000 
in banknotes while the entire volume of apólices 
negotiated on the secondary market was 33,000 
contos in 12 months (Franco, 1983, page 107). 
Apparently, no one inspected Mayrink´s books 
to see if he had purchased the 50,000 contos of 
apólices necessary to back his issue.   
Three of the ministers in the provisional 
government numbered among the banks´ most 
outspoken critics: the war minister General Ben-
jamin Constant Botelho de Magalhães, the jus-
tice minister Manuel Ferraz de Campos Sales, 
and the agriculture minister Demetrio Ribeiro. 
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All three offered their resignations. Benjamin 
Constant remained in the provisional govern-
ment when Marshal Deodoro appealed to him in 
the name of the unity of the armed forces. Cam-
pos Sales withdrew his resignation after Barbosa 
promised to allow the establishment of a bank of 
issue in São Paulo that Campos Sales´ party, the 
PRP, could control (Abranches, 1954, page 91). 
Ribeiro left the government.
The privileged banks of the monarchy, 
the Banco do Brasil and the Banco Nacional, 
did not remain out in the cold. In March, as 
Mayrink´s issue limit was reduced to 50,000 
contos, these two banks received the same issue 
limits under even more favorable circumstances. 
They could issue each these 50,000 contos ba-
cked 50% by gold but not convertible into gold 
until the exchange returned to par and remained 
there for one year, an extremely unlikely event. 
An unconvertible gold backed note is nonsense; 
these banks received the right to print money. 
Together with Mayrink´s Banco dos Estados 
Unidos do Brasil, with its 50,000 of bond backed 
notes, where no one inspected the bonds, the 
three institutions could in effect almost double 
the circulating medium. Two noteworthy events 
occurred in August: Barbosa permitted Mayrink 
to issue 50,000 contos of gold backed but un-
convertible banknotes, like the two former mo-
narchist institutions could issue, taking his total 
limit back up to 100,000 contos, and Mayrink 
gave Barbosa a mansion in Rio.6 By September, 
the circulating medium had risen from 210,000 
contos in January to 280,000 contos, after years 
of stability.
Once these banks began to issue, the sto-
ck market boom returned while the milreis conti-
nued its decline despite excellent coffee exports. 
In May, Barbosa discontinued Ouro Preto´s 
loans to agriculture after disbursing an additional 
14,000 contos to pet banks. That same month, he 
began collecting 20% of the import tariffs in gold 
to compensate for the loss of revenue due to the 
devaluation. In October, he decided to collect 
100% of the tariffs in gold forcing up the cost 
of living. That same month of October, Barbosa 
took steps to curb the most egregious practices 
of the stock market, receiving praise from his 
loudest critics.7 Within two months, the leaders 
of the Encilhamento discovered ways around the 
new rules, and the abuses began again. This mon-
th, December of 1890, Barbosa gave Mayrink a 
final present: the minister authorized the merger 
of the Banco dos Estados Unidos and the Ban-
co Nacional to form the Banco da Republica. 
The surviving bank received the issue rights of 
the two merging banks as well as those of the 
Banco do Brasil which sold these to Mayrink. 
The banker´s dream came true as he could issue 
150,000 of unconvertible gold backed notes plus 
50,000 backed by bonds no one inspected. He 
could finally double the circulating medium at 
the beginning of the Republic. Increased issues, 
facilitating and encouraging capital flight, forced 
the exchange down to 20d, a level seen at the 
trough of the previous coffee cycle during the 
early 1880s.
While Barbosa prepared his final gift 
to Mayrink, two important events transpired, 
one outside and one inside Brazil. Barings, the 
second most powerful merchant bank after Ro-
thschilds, became insolvent due to excessive ex-
posure to Argentina and had to be bailed out by 
a group of banks led by the Bank of England and 
Rothschilds. Investor appetite for Latin Ameri-
ca fell off as Argentina had been the most acti-
ve market in the region, followed precisely by 
Brazil, now experiencing a financial bubble of its 
own. Inside Brazil, the provisional government 
successfully conducted legislative elections in 
September convening congress on November 
15, the first anniversary of the proclamation of 
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the Republic.  
Already at the beginning of the legislati-
ve session, the PRP, the Republican Party of São 
Paulo, elected Prudente de Morais as the presi-
dent of the senate. São Paulo emerged as the ri-
chest state in the new Republic exporting twice as 
much as Rio de Janeiro. The PRP expected Pru-
dente to be elected president by the constituents 
as soon as they passed the new constitution. As 
so often happens after military coups, the officers 
acquired a taste for political power, and Deodoro 
presented his candidacy as an alternative to that 
of Prudente. Campos Sales, representative of the 
PRP in the provisional government, as well as 
several colleagues, supported Prudente and had 
themselves elected to congress. At the end of Ja-
nuary, the entire provisional government resig-
ned. Barbosa had by this time lost the confidence 
of Deodoro due to the low exchange and had not 
won the confidence of the PRP which generally 
disapproved of the Encilhamento in Rio. He the-
refore left the ministry of finance to take up his 
seat as senator from Bahia.  Deodoro replaced 
the provisional ministers with former monar-
chists mostly from the Northeast. The baron of 
Lucena, occupied first the ministry of agriculture 
and then the ministry of finance and acted as if he 
were the prime minister. He took over Barbosa´s 
friendships with Mayrink and the other leaders 
of the Encilhamento. Described as a plunderer 
by the British minister (Schulz, 2008, page 91) 
when he assumed office, Lucena went on to pro-
ve the minister correct. 
On February 24, 1891, the constitution 
went into effect. The following day, congress 
elected a president and vice president to serve 
until November 15, 1894. By threats and bribery, 
Deodoro won the election. His second minister 
of war, Marshal Floriano Peixoto, endorsed both 
by Deodoro and by Prudente, became the vice 
president. The PRP started a ferocious opposition 
while Lucena continued to encourage the bubble. 
By the second quarter, although Mayrink issued 
ever increasing amounts of notes, prices on the 
stock exchange began to fall. By the third quar-
ter, the milreis sank to 14d, lower than it had 
ever been, even during the worst moments of the 
Paraguayan War. Coffee prices remained high 
demonstrating that excessive issues caused this 
currency collapse, as contemporaries percei-
ved.  By September of 1891, eight months af-
ter Lucena took office, the Banco da Republica 
had 300,000 contos of notes in circulation, an 
immense amount, without considering paper 
money or other banknotes, equal to 150% of the 
circulating medium at the proclamation of the 
Republic 22 months before. Lucena now propo-
sed to congress to double this limit to 600,000 
contos. He lacked the votes to do so. Partially 
in response to opposition in congress, Deodo-
ro and Lucena staged the “stock market coup”, 
closing the legislature by force on November 3. 
Immediately, the PRP, in control of São Paulo, 
began to conspire with the navy and with vice 
president Floriano Peixoto. A strike of railroad 
workers, their standard of living compromised 
by the inflation that accompanied the devalua-
tion, isolated the capital by land while the navy 
severed sea communications. Realizing that he 
could not even count on the garrison of Rio and 
not wishing to start a civil war, the first president 
of the Republic resigned on November 23, only 
20 days after the coup.
Vice President Floriano Peixoto assumed 
power with the desire to end the Encilhamento 
and return to the prudent finances of the monar-
chy. He also wished to consolidate the Republic 
while providing protection for national industry. 
These three goals conflicted with one another as 
he pursued all three in tandem. The PRP had ho-
ped that Floriano would follow the letter of the 
constitution and hold new presidential elections 
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as Deodoro´s term still had more than two years 
to run. Floriano argued that the transitory articles 
of the constitution provided that the first presi-
dent and vice president should serve until No-
vember 15, 1894, and he always referred to him-
self as vice president. The PRP accepted this in-
terpretation in exchange for control of São Paulo 
and the selection of one of their own, Francisco 
de Paula Rodrigues Alves, as minister of finance. 
Rodrigues Alves took office with the 
milreis at a new low of 12d. The cost of living 
in Rio, highly dependent on imports, became in-
tolerable for those on fixed salaries while indus-
trialists who had ordered foreign machinery now 
had to pay twice as many milreis for these. The 
first six months of government proved chaotic. 
While the senate resisted Rodrigues Alves´ cam-
paign to prohibit further banknote issue, Floria-
no concentrated his energies on deposing all the 
governors who had accepted Deodoro´s coup. In 
fact, only one governor, Lauro Sodré of Pará, re-
pudiated the coup and another, Julio de Castilhos 
of Rio Grande do Sul, was ousted even before 
Deodoro fell in Rio. All the other governors were 
removed by force by March of 1892. It looked as 
though the country would fall apart. The leaders 
of the Encilhamento organized several unsucces-
sful coups culminating in a major conspiracy to 
depose Floriano in April. When soldiers purpor-
tedly bribed by a leading railroad owner failed 
to appear, Floriano counter attacked capturing 
and deporting to the Amazon some 40 figures 
including politicians, bankers. journalists, and 
military officers.
Floriano and Rodrigues Alves had little 
time to savor this victory. On the one hand, a 
group of economic nationalists organized a cam-
paign to bail out those industries suffering from 
the collapse of the exchange. Here Rodrigues Al-
ves began to part company with Floriano and his 
minister of industry, Colonel Serzedello Correa. 
Floriano and Serzedello felt the need for Brazil 
to be self-sufficient at least regarding light indus-
try and threw their weight behind the industria-
lists, even if this meant delaying the balancing 
of the budget, another major goal of theirs. The 
campaign for industry proved a free for all with 
the profiteers of the Encilhamento favoring the 
bail out together with the young military officers 
around Floriano and against the PRP. To finally 
complicate an already difficult situation, in June, 
Floriano restored Julio de Castilhos to the gover-
norship of Rio Grande do Sul from which he had 
been deposed in November precisely for suppor-
ting Deodoro´s coup. Floriano felt that Castilhos 
was the only republican capable of maintaining 
the state against the old monarchist politicians. 
That same month of June one of 
Floriano´s followers proposed issuing 100,000 
contos of internal bonds to finance the industries 
through the banking system. The Rothschilds wi-
red their disapproval of this inflationary measure. 
Simultaneously, Rodrigues Alves, who also dis-
liked the aid to industry, negotiated a nine, twel-
ve, and fifteen-month loan with the Rothschilds, 
the first external borrowing of the Republic.
Two months later, the finance minister 
resigned, largely against aid to industry which 
he considered inflationary as well as inefficient, 
and Floriano replaced him with Serzedello. Ser-
zedello believed both in the gold standard and in 
protecting industry. His varied political, military, 
and business career was crowned with his elec-
tion in 1904 as the first president of the Centro 
Industrial do Brasil. Unable to reorganize the 
financial system through a congress still highly 
influenced by the leaders of the Encilhamento, 
Floriano and Serzedello waited until parliamen-
tary recess. In December they merged the Banco 
da Republica with the Banco do Brasil, placing 
the president of the latter institution, former 
Liberal prime minister Manuel Pinto de Souza 
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Dantas, as president of the surviving entity with 
the senator from São Paulo, Rangel Pestana, as 
vice president.  The government authorized the 
surviving entity to issue 100,000 contos of 5% 
30-year bonds to finance its bail out of industry. 
At the same time, the president and his minister 
raised the tariffs on textiles, the first time in Bra-
zilian history where protection counted for more 
than revenue. Not until over a generation later 
would Brazil again have such an avowedly pro-
-industry government in office.
The Rothschilds applauded the merger 
and the termination of further banknote issues 
although, of course, they did not like the indus-
trial bonds. In any case, they approved first of 
Rodrigues Alves and now of Serzedello to the 
point of underwriting a term loan on behalf of 
the Oeste de Minas railway (which delivered the 
proceeds of the loan in gold to the government in 
return for paper money in Brazil). The exchange 
market showed its contentment with Serzedello 
by rising to 13d in early 1893 while the external 
bond market also recovered. 
Unfortunately, in April, Serzedello re-
signed in protest against what he considered 
an erroneous policy pursued by Floriano in Rio 
Grande do Sul. The previous June, the vice pre-
sident restored Julio de Castilhos as governor. In 
February, the state suffered an invasion by for-
ces, both monarchist and republican, hostile to 
the governor. Rather than attempt a mediation, 
Floriano gave all his support to Castilhos while 
deaths, especially by throat slitting, rose.  Navy 
minister Admiral Custodio de Melo resigned 
with Serzedello against the Rio Grande policy. 
From this point, Floriano and his new finance 
minister, Felisbelo Freire, attempted no further 
reforms while struggling to find means to pursue 
the civil war.
In September Admiral Custodio led the 
fleet into rebellion, expecting to repeat the quick 
overthrow of Deodoro. This time, things went 
differently; the army staid loyal to Floriano who 
held the capital. The naval revolt added a new 
dimension to the civil war and placed the vice 
president in the hands of the PRP. To suppress 
the rebellion, he agreed to allow the election of 
Prudente as president, which occurred in March 
1894. Floriano appealed to the foreign powers 
with warships in Guanabara Bay to prevent the 
rebellious fleet from bombarding the city. At the 
same time, his partisans accused the British of 
aiding the monarchists in Rio Grande do Sul. 
Floriano purchased a new fleet in the United Sta-
tes and had it sail down to Brazil (Topik, 1996). 
Presumably the United States favored the Repu-
blic. In fact, the participation of the foreign states 
proved limited, with Portugal ultimately playing 
a leading role. When the rebels in Guanabara 
Bay scuttled their ships in March of 1894, they 
were received onboard two Portuguese warships, 
an act that provoked a public outcry against the 
Lusitanians. As the Portuguese bakers were al-
ways the scapegoats for the high price of bread, 
several suffered harassments or worse after the 
escape of the rebels. Floriano broke off diplo-
matic relations with Portugal, which were only 
restored the following year by the Marshal´s 
successor.
Floriano´s recapture of Guanabara Bay, 
followed by victories over the rebels in Parana 
and Santa Catarina, led observers to wonder if 
he would in fact turn power over to the oligarchy 
in the person of Prudente. Floriano ungracefully 
declined to attend Prudente´s inauguration but 
did not interfere with the proceedings. With the 
war still active in Rio Grande do Sul, Prudente 
took over a country with severe financial diffi-
culties. He summoned Rodrigues Alves back 
to the ministry of finance with a conservative 
agenda. Their top priority was to reduce the cir-
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culating medium, now 708,000 contos, or triple 
its size at the beginning of the Republic. In con-
sequence of Floriano´s printing paper money to 
finance the war in the South, the milreis had des-
cended to 10d, just over a third of its parity, ten-
ding to confirm believers in the quantity theory 
of money. The most pressing economy measure 
was to negotiate an end to the fighting, achieved 
in July of 1895, not coincidentally a month after 
the death of Floriano. In their first two years in 
office, Prudente and Rodrigues Alves succeeded 
in reducing the circulating medium to 678,000 
contos.
Unfortunately for Prudente, the coffee 
trees planted during the euphoria of the Encilha-
mento began to bear fruit just as he took office. 
As Brazil produced most of the world´s coffee, 
prices fell drastically. Now Prudente faced the 
demands of his allies in São Paulo for easier 
money. Attempting a contractionary monetary 
policy during a commodity down turn proved 
to be an extremely difficult task. The consen-
sus, both inside Brazil and outside, thought the 
government should seek to restore the parity of 
27d, in effect since 1846 and loosely maintained 
under the monarchy. On the other hand, one of 
Prudente´s advisers, the Englishman J. P. Wile-
man, suggested the president defend the current 
10d without attempting to return to parity. Wi-
leman argued that rising exchange had negative 
effects just as great as declining currency. When 
currency fell, salaries lagged so the poor earned 
less. When currency rose, employers quickly re-
duced salaries or made workers redundant. Any 
variation in exchange made it difficult for busi-
nessmen to calculate their costs. Countering the 
argument that devaluation constituted an expro-
priation of creditors who placed their faith in the 
state, Wileman stated that apolices had changed 
hands since their issue so that an appreciation of 
the milreis would benefit unduly those who ac-
quired these instruments along the way. History 
tended to agree with Wileman especially after 
the British government´s disastrous return to pa-
rity in 1925.
Prudente did not follow Wileman´s advi-
ce and sought to strengthen the milreis. The local 
market believed that, at least, the period of deva-
luation had come to a close, so Rodrigues Alves 
proved successfully placed a large issue of apó-
lices. The Rothschilds also believed in the PRP 
government and underwrote an international 
bond issue. The devaluation had decreased the 
cost of servicing the local debt in relative terms 
while increasing the portion of the budget neces-
sary to cover the international debt. A portion of 
the proceeds of the new international bond surely 
went to pay interest on previous issues.
In addition to balancing the budget and 
contracting the circulating medium, Prudente 
wished to nationalize the former banks of issue 
as well as their banknotes which had become pa-
per currency in fact. During his first two years in 
office, he proved unable to win legislative appro-
val for this measure. In fact, he did not control 
congress at all. In November of 1896, in the mi-
ddle of his four-year term, Prudente took a leave 
of absence for health reasons. His vice president, 
Manuel Vitorino Pereira, changed the entire cabi-
net when he took office, and many believed that 
Prudente would never return. Although the presi-
dent and the vice president had become enemies, 
they agreed on the necessity of nationalizing the 
banks of issue which Vitorino executed shortly 
after coming into power. Given the debt of the 
Banco da Republica and the others to the state, 
the government saw no reason to pay compen-
sation to the former shareholders. As Prudente 
had desired, the banknotes became government 
paper money while the state took the gold and 
bonds backing these issues, even if this backing 
proved considerably less than the volume of 
Around the British Gold Standard: Portugal and Brazil, Two Satellites?
39História e Economia Revista Interdisciplinar 
notes outstanding. The experiment with private 
banknotes, begun under the monarchy in 1888, 
had come to an end. Although privately-issued 
banknotes continued until well into the twentieth 
century in countries like the United States and 
Australia, Brazil never tried them again.
In March of 1897, Prudente recovered to 
the point where he could resume office. While 
coffee prices continued downward, he had to 
fund a costly military campaign against a mille-
narian movement in the Northeast. After victory 
over these rebels in October, Prudente survived 
an assassination plot the next month that killed 
his minister of war. The president seized the 
opportunity to crush the conspirators and win 
control over congress. For better or worse, the 
presidents who followed Prudente through the 
end of the First Republic in 1930, all enjoyed 
immense power during their terms. As a sign 
of his force, the incumbent had no difficulty in 
making a fellow Paulista, former justice minister 
Campos Sales, his successor.  On the economic 
front, Prudente had less success during his final 
two years and found himself obliged to expand 
the circulating medium as a consequence of the 
military expenses as well as the decline of tariff 
revenues. The milreis duly fell to 7d, its lowest 
level prior to World War I.
Faced with difficulties in meeting his ex-
ternal debt payments, Prudente arranged a two-
-year external loan in November of 1897 as a 
stopgap. It became clear to both the government 
and the Rothschilds that a more comprehensive 
renegotiation must take place. Both parties ac-
ted with a long-term perspective, and both par-
ties did well because of their farsightedness. The 
indebted government sent the president-elect to 
London to negotiate, an unusual gesture which 
highlighted its commitment to honoring its obli-
gations. The bankers, for their part, agreed to go 
three years without interest payment in cash, as 
they received new bonds therefore, and thirteen 
years without principal payments. The country 
won time while the creditors received payments 
as agreed from 1901 until the First World War 
stopped all gold remittances
The Rothschilds based their decision to 
support Prudente and Campos Sales largely on 
Brazil´s good payments record. During the Em-
pire, the external debt, consumed less than 10% 
of exports. Even under the Republic, debt pay-
ments to exports, known as the debt service ratio 
in financial circles, generally stood only slightly 
over 10%. This ratio was considered quite con-
servative. During the Empire, Brazil´s external 
and internal debt payments each ranged from 
just over 10% to just under 20% of the national 
budget. Devaluation during the Republic caused 
the service of the internal debt to fall below 10% 
while the external service reached 25% which 
precipitated the renegotiation (Schulz, 2013, 
page 251). Brazil´s debt figures compared favo-
rably to those of many European countries.
Campos Sales took office in November 
of 1898 with the Funding Loan in place and 
with the discovery of additional gold reserves in 
South Africa and Alaska. Coffee prices remai-
ned stable while the volume of exports boomed 
bringing Brazil much needed gold. Together with 
his finance minister, Joaquim Murtinho, Campos 
Sales increased revenues while diminishing ex-
penditures. He raised income by levying Brazil´s 
first excise, on alcohol and tobacco, and by char-
ging a quarter of the import tariffs in gold. The 
president and his minister lowered expenses on 
the army and navy. They succeeded in redu-
cing the circulating medium, which had reached 
733,000 contos at the end of Prudente´s term, 
down to 675,000 by the end of their term. As 
gold flowed in and fewer milreis circulated, the 
value of the milreis rose from 7d at their inau-
guration to 14d two years later. Campos Sales 
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also ignored Wileman´s advice which suggested 
adopting a new, lower parity. Even with the ex-
change doubling, Campos Sales not only failed 
to announce a new parity but he and his minister 
spoke of regaining 27d.
 In March of 1900, Murtinho made an 
agreement with the shareholders of the Banco 
da Republica to give them back the right to elect 
their two top officers that Serzedelo´s decree had 
assigned to the government in 1892. Murtinho 
also negotiated a partial forgiveness of the offi-
cial loans to the bank in return for a schedule for 
the repayment of the rest of the government´s ex-
tensive loans to the bank. Like many of the other 
banks in Rio, the Banco da Republica took posi-
tions in gold and the milreis. The directors had 
speculated on the milreis when it hit 14d in July 
before receding to 10d the next month. With the 
decline of the milreis, the public began withdra-
wals at the bank which appealed to the govern-
ment for help. Although displeased with having 
to make loans instead of receiving repayment as 
negotiated earlier in the year, Murtinho did offer 
loans in sterling. In September, the directors ran 
out of cash and suspended, provoking the worst 
financial crisis in Brazil´s history thus far. No 
fewer than eight banks suspended, and many had 
to be liquidated. Contemporaries called this cri-
sis the liquidation of the Encilhamento.
The terms of the Funding Loan preclu-
ded Murtinho from allowing a bank to issue 
banknotes as in 1857 and 1864 and limited the 
government´s issue of paper money, as in 1875, 
to the amount outstanding in 1898. He could 
therefore lend only 25,000 contos, a modera-
te amount of paper. He had already lent, in the 
month prior to suspension, L1,000,000, equiva-
lent to 30,000 contos. To provide liquidity to the 
Banco da Republica, the minister supplied the 
bank with 100,000 contos of five-year govern-
ment bonds with a coupon of 3%. In return for 
the bond, the sterling advance, and the loan of 
paper money, Murtinho obtained from the sha-
reholders the pledge of all their shares as well 
as the right to appoint the two principal officers 
that he had relinquished in March. From then on, 
there was no question that the Banco da Republi-
ca was the government´s bank.  In a few weeks, 
both the creditors and the shareholders accepted 
Murtinho´s proposal. During the month that it 
took to print and distribute the bonds, the Rio 
market remained paralyzed as few merchants 
had the liquidity to make payments. As soon as 
the bonds hit the street, they circulated as qua-
si currency, and the economy began to recover. 
Both Brazil´s international and its domestic debt 
rose on the secondary market.
Murtinho received criticism from all si-
des. Merchants complained that he did not do 
enough to secure liquidity for the market and 
that many firms could have survived if only he 
had made available a bit more resources. Foreig-
ners attacked him as overly permissive. In fact, 
he acted with energy to provide significant liqui-
dity to the market while scrupulously observing 
the terms of the Funding Loan. Successful tight 
money policies invite the question of whether 
they would still have been successful if they had 
been less tight. What we know is that the Bra-
zilian economy enjoyed 14 years of expansion 
following the crisis of 1900. On July 1, 1901, 
Brazil resumed cash payments on its external 
debt, and shortly thereafter, obtained a large 
facility from the Rothschilds which Murtinho 
employed to purchase several loss-making rail-
roads. This purchase saved the large payments 
of guaranteed interest that the government had 
been disbursing for years. Murtinho also rented 
out railroad lines in the government´s possession 
receiving rent instead of losing money. Campos 
Sales delivered his office to former finance mi-
nister Rodrigues Alves with the milreis at 12d 
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and the economy booming.
Portugal, 1890-1902
Before the term “gay” acquired a new 
meaning, the 1890s were commonly referred 
to as the Gay Nineties. The generation that ex-
perienced the first world war quite naturally re-
called this decade as a wonderful, peaceful, and 
prosperous time when the rich could revel in the 
fruits of material progress and the middle class 
in the United States could enjoy the comforts of 
indoor plumbing and telephones. In one sense, 
this was true. In terms of finance, it proved to 
be a most difficult decade for many states. The 
Great Depression, which had begun in 1873, 
persisted. Several countries like Argentina, in 
1890, had to suspend the service of their debts 
while others, like Italy, in 1894, had to abandon 
the gold standard. The United States, which had 
already overtaken Britain to become the largest 
economy in the world, almost had to abandon the 
gold standard twice, in 1893 and again in 1895. 
As these events happened at different times, in-
ternal factors rather than one acute world crisis 
must be the causes of their difficulties.
We have seen in the case of Brazil, the 
crisis dragged on for the whole of the 1890s due 
to three separate and consecutive factors: first 
from 1888 to 1891, an attempt to placate the 
debt-ridden Rio coffee planters by easy money. 
After the governments that pursued this policy 
were repudiated and overthrown, a new presi-
dent, Marshal Floriano Peixoto, tried to return to 
conservative practices on one hand but became 
involved in a costly civil war he might have been 
able to avoid. His successor, in office from 1894 
to 1898, achieved peace rapidly but failed to ba-
lance his budget due to a collapse of coffee pri-
ces. Only with the recovery of coffee did Brazil 
regain financial stability. Portugal suffered from 
four problems that occurred simultaneously du-
ring the entire decade. Brazil was Portugal´s first 
problem. With the slide of the Brazilian curren-
cy during the bubble, it became more expensive 
to send remittances to Portugal, so this major 
source of revenue shrank. We can recall that re-
mittances from Brazil exceeded that country´s 
external debt payments. Only with Brazil´s re-
covery at the end of the decade did remittances 
return to their level of the 1880s with a positive 
effect on the value of the Portuguese currency. 
There was nothing the Portuguese authorities 
could do to ameliorate this problem except chea-
pen their own currency which they did in 1891. 
Mata (Mata, 1987, page 33) demonstrates that by 
1896, the volume of remittances returned to the 
level of 1889. Ironically, the collapse of the Bra-
zilian milreis in 1890 is described by a local jour-
nalist as in part caused by merchants, particularly 
Portuguese, sending money out of the country in 
the expectation that things would deteriorate fur-
ther.8 Given the decline in Portuguese receipts, 
this observation begs the question of where the 
funds went. Probably a fair amount left Brazil 
by exchange operations at British, Portuguese, or 
Brazilian banks and went to banks in England. 
International private banking with England as a 
jurisdiction of destination appeared during the 
very end of the seventeenth century and expan-
ded enormously with the receipt of emigrant 
money during the French Revolution (Healey, 
1992). By the 1890s, investors enjoyed a wide 
choice among banks in England. At this time, 
wealthy Portuguese taking funds out of Brazil 
might have found it to be much less risky to park 
these resources in London rather than bringing 
them into their own country.
Other than Brazil, Portugal´s three 
problems were: the decline of wine exports, 
the dispute over the African colonies, and an 
unfortunate decision regarding the payment of 
the public debt. Due to vine diseases in France 
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during the 1880s, Portugal sold large quantities 
of wine to that country which both consumed 
and re-sold the Portuguese beverage to others. 
As the French production of wine recovered and 
France imported more from its African colonies, 
Portuguese wine exports to that country declined 
significantly beginning in 1887. England, 
Portugal´s traditional wine consumer had been 
reducing its purchases for several decades due 
in part to a change in preferences away from 
fortified wine and in part to accommodate other 
trading partners. In this case, Portugal had to 
find new markets for wine and other products. 
During the 1890s, while France fell to become 
an entirely marginal market for Portugal, the 
African colonies, Brazil, and to a lesser extent, 
Germany and Spain all absorbed greater 
quantities of Lusitanian exports (Lains, 1995, 
page 93). Wine represented 50% of Portuguese 
exports during the 1880s as compared to 43.6% 
during the following decade (Lains, 1995, pages 
92, 106-107). 
The problems of foreign relations 
over Africa and the public debt ran together. 
By 1890, England held both Egypt and South 
Africa and wished to connect the two by rail. In 
the latter country, England ruled directly over 
English speaking areas but only loosely over 
Dutch speaking Transvaal and Orange. From 
the previous decade, one of the goals of British 
foreign policy had been to assure free use in 
wartime of Lourenço Marques, now Maputo, and 
then not yet until 1898 capital of Mozambique; 
expansionist leader Cecil Rhodes advocated 
outright annexation. 
During the 1880s, as noted previously, 
the English had not yet decided whether their 
main potential rival was Germany or France. As 
England quarreled more with France, precisely 
over Suez and other parts of Africa, there existed 
a group within the British elite that looked to 
an alliance with Germany. Only after the Boer 
War, during the first decade of the twentieth 
century, did it become likely that England would 
join France and Russia against Germany. After 
Portugal´s failure to gain the north bank of the 
Congo in 1884, the Portuguese government 
turned its attention to occupying the territory 
between its East and West African colonies. 
Unfortunately, the Lusitanians came too late as 
the British, moving south from Kenya and north 
from South Africa had already commenced the 
occupation of what is today Zimbabwe and 
Zambia. Both the British and the Portuguese 
lacked tack. The Portuguese leaders should 
have bent over backwards to not antagonize 
their major creditor, major consumer, and shield 
against a highly acquisitive Germany, looking 
over Portugal´s shoulders from Namibia and 
Tanganyika. The British for their part should 
have been careful not to de-stabilize a monarchist 
regime that held various strategic bits of land in 
case of hostilities with another great power. In a 
world of coaling stations, the Azores, Madeira, 
and the African colonies, especially Lourenço 
Marques, proved valuable assets.   
A recent Portuguese historian (Costa, 
1998, page 62) places most of the blame for the 
confrontation with Britain on the shoulders of 
the Portuguese foreign minister, Barros Gomes, 
and his group.  Diplomacy did not prevail as 
the Portuguese government sent troops into 
areas where the English already had established, 
if small, bases, and the British reacted by 
presenting a formal ultimatum to the Portuguese 
authorities to desist in these disputed areas or face 
war. Once the ultimatum came, the Portuguese 
government had no choice and backed down by 
the next day. The consensus is that the ultimatum 
cost the monarchy a good deal of support and 
released great feelings of humiliation among 
the elite as well as among the lower middle 
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urban groups. Consumers boycotted English 
goods while employees left British enterprises. 
One intellectual apparently committed suicide 
illustrating the depth of feeling.  On the other 
hand, Eça de Queiroz opined that Portugal´s 
problem was Portugal and not external powers 
(Monica, 2009, pages 365-366). The economic 
consequences of the ultimatum were minimal. 
Portugal retained a territory in Africa beyond 
its resources to develop. A railroad across from 
Luanda or Lobito to Lourenço Marques or Beira 
would not have made much difference to the 
progress of Portuguese Africa. When the dust 
settled, England and Portugal made a treaty, 
within 18 months of the ultimatum, giving 
access to Lourenço Marques to Britain in case 
of war and maintaining Portugal´s claim to 
many square miles that it had not yet effectively 
occupied. The British government also took steps 
to show its support for the Portuguese monarchy, 
which, thereby regained part of its lost prestige 
(Marques, 2009). By this time, however, the 
ultimatum helped provoke a major financial 
crisis that would disturb Anglo-Portuguese 
relations in a different way.
During 1890, as we have seen, 
remittances from Brazil seem to have plummeted, 
even though a considerable amount of capital 
flight from that country occurred. At the same 
time, wine sales to France almost disappeared 
placing the government in a gold shortage. 
Both external and internal borrowing became 
progressively more difficult as many potential 
lenders considered Portugal to be what we 
would call today over-leveraged. In November, 
Barings, Portugal´s principal bankers, had to 
suspend due to over commitment in Argentina. 
The Bank of England and Rothschilds rescued 
Barings but new facilities from this bank were 
out of the question. Rothschilds had contacts 
with the Portuguese authorities at this time, but 
no loans proved forthcoming from this source. 
That year, the finance minister muddled through. 
On January 31, 1891, a major if unsuccessful 
republican uprising in Porto further jostled an 
already nervous market. During the beginning of 
this year, to anticipate revenues, the government 
rented out the tobacco monopoly, an expedient 
utilized at various moments in the past. This 
action constituted a return to tax farming. By 
May, the Banco de Portugal held too little 
gold to guarantee conversion of its banknotes. 
The government accordingly relieved all the 
issuing banks of converting their banknotes 
for sixty days. When this sixty-day period 
proved insufficient, Portugal abandoned the 
gold standard indefinitely in July. The other 
issuing banks could also not convert their notes 
and finally gave up the issue privileges that the 
authorities had attempted to cancel in 1877 and 
again in 1887. Circulation would henceforth 
consist of Banco de Portugal notes and paper 
money. Leaving the gold standard further 
effected the self-esteem of the elite. But it was 
probably a good idea. Brazil and other Latin 
American countries had benefitted from not 
being on the gold standard. With a depreciating 
currency, Portugal´s exports would become 
cheaper while immigrants´ remittances would 
go further in Portugal. Importers and creditors of 
the internal debt were the two groups who would 
be negatively impacted.
Off the gold standard, the Portuguese 
state honored its commitments to both internal 
and external creditors during 1891. Early in 
1892, a new minister, the historian Oliveira 
Martins, decided that drastic action had to 
be taken regarding the debt payments which 
consumed half of the budget. Perhaps, had 
the Barings house enjoyed a normal situation, 
the debt negotiation could have been similar 
to the one Campos Sales was to agree with 
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the Rothschilds. Unfortunately, there were 
no serious negotiations, and the Portuguese 
government unilaterally imposed a settlement 
which the creditors did not accept. Oliveira 
Martins may have thought that he was raising 
taxes, but the creditors certainly considered his 
actions a default (Costa et al, 2011, pages 358-
361). The minister raised the withholding tax 
on the domestic debt from 3% to 30%. As no 
other type of income was taxed at this level, this 
measure could be understood as a partial default. 
The domestic bonds, since 1852, were consols 
or perpetual debt without amortizations so that 
an increase on the tax on the interest reduced the 
yield by the same percentage. 
Treatment of the foreign creditors was 
even worse. Of the three per cent interest due 
on the successive international issues since 
the re-negotiation of 1852, only one per cent 
would be paid in gold. The other two per cent 
would be paid in Portuguese currency subject 
to the 30% tax. Amortizations of principal, on 
those external loans that had amortizations, 
were also cancelled (Mata, 1987, page 26). Of 
the two per cent paid in Portugal, 30% would 
be taxed. Of the remaining 1.4% after taxes, 
at the very least, the creditor would sustain a 
major exchange loss plus associated expenses. 
It is not clear how negotiable the paper received 
from the government would be. In practice, the 
creditor could at the end of the day receive only 
one third of that which was due on interest and 
no principal in the foreseeable future.  At any 
period, this act of the Portuguese government 
comes very close to a unilateral repudiation and 
must have caused the worst possible impression 
on the international financial community.
Portugal´s balance of payments had 
caused creditors to worry already in the 1880s. By 
1891, the figures had become untenable: exports 
L 4.4 million, imports L 8.2 million, immigrant 
remittances L 2.0 million, and external debt 
payments L 2.6 million.9 External debt payments 
to exports, the debt service ratio, exceeded 50%, 
by itself a sign of disaster. Remember, we noted 
above Brazil´s debt service ratio at this time of 
11%. Even if we add remittances to exports in 
the denominator, which is generally not done, 
the debt service ratio would still be over 40%. 
Portugal´s internal and external debt payments 
consumed half of the budget compared to 
Brazil´s one quarter to one third. While the 
numbers show that Portugal could only meet 
its external obligations by new borrowing, the 
unilateral repudiation could probably have been 
avoided.
Oliveira Martins moved in the highest 
intellectual and social circles including the 
court. The government in which he participated 
represented an opportunity for reform at a 
moment when part of the elite recognized the need 
for change following national humiliation at the 
hands of England as well as national bankruptcy. 
King Carlos, who had spent a good deal of 
time with Oliveira Martins, gave his full and 
considerable support. The minister, for his part, 
wished to enhance the already great powers of 
the monarchy reversing the example of Victorian 
Britain where the queen increasingly reigned but 
did not rule. Oliveira Martins, the king, and many 
intellectuals such as Eça de Queirós recognized 
the need to curb corruption while reforming 
public finances. To his credit, Oliveira Martins 
attempted to raise taxes and reduce expenses 
to eliminate the chronic and deteriorating fiscal 
deficit that accompanied the balance of payments 
deficit. In various respects, his possibilities for 
action were limited by the unwillingness of most 
politicians to change a system that benefitted 
themselves. The consensus among politicians 
that prevailed until the death of Fontes in 1887 
had, by 1891, broken down resulting in a degree 
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of paralysis. Regarding the debt itself, Fontes 
cast the giant shadow: his renegotiation during 
the 1850s served as Oliveira Martin´s example 
as it included precisely a decrease in interest. 
But the context was different. While Fontes 
proved able to negotiate with Barings in 1854, 
Oliveira Martins could not do so as the bank had 
its own problems. The anti-English atmosphere 
of the ultimatum also made an understanding 
more difficult as the minister had to be seen as 
standing up to John Bull. As compared to the 
Brazilian deal obtained from the Rothschilds, 
which of course was seven years in the future, 
the Portuguese decision gave the creditors some 
immediate cash while Brazil provided none. 
But the negotiated solution pleased the creditors 
infinitely more. Oliveira Martins would have 
been far better off paying nothing but negotiating 
longer than by his unilateral action.
It should be no surprise that it took 
Portugal ten years to come to an agreement 
with its creditors. It should also be no surprise 
that Portugal only received one small loan in 
England during the period of dispute, in 1896, 
and only one other small facility after the 
renegotiation, in 1912 (Mata, 1987, page 26). 
The loan of 1896 was guaranteed by the tax on 
tobacco, already alienated to a private syndicate 
under exceptionally favorable terms, an unusual 
arrangement for the late nineteenth century 
(Mata, 2010, page 18). By June of 1892, Portugal 
came to be considered a deadbeat. From the time 
Portugal abandoned the gold standard, Cecil 
Rhodes pressured both the British government 
and his bankers, the Rothschilds, to purchase 
what he called Delagoa Bay: Lourenço Marques. 
The Rothschilds declined to help and told him 
that the Portuguese did not want to sell the port, 
and no one would force them to do so. (Ferguson, 
1998, page 887). In 1893, the Portuguese did not 
have the same luck with the Germans who seized 
a disputed area in the north of Mozambique.
In 1892, Portugal increased the level 
of its industrial tariffs to raise revenues as well 
as to become more self-sufficient. This time 
the legislators paid particular attention to the 
colonies giving continental Portuguese industries 
a privileged position in these markets. Gradually 
Africa began to become an economic asset and 
generate revenues for the Portuguese economy. 
In two steps, 1889 and 1899, Portugal 
imposed high duties on wheat to protect 
domestic producers. As a consequence of the 
“Law of Hunger”, the cost of living of urban 
workers jumped enhancing their inclination to 
strike and to join opposition groups such as the 
Republicans and the Socialists. Portugal was 
in good company as Bismarck had adopted the 
same policy of protecting grain for Germany. 
Agricultural protection has always been even 
more controversial than industrial protection. 
Taxes on wheat reduced the volume of imports 
leading to lower tax collection.
Oliveira Martins´ tenure as minister 
lasted only a few months, but his various 
successors over the next decade failed to reach 
an agreement with the creditors due to Portugal´s 
continued balance of payments deficit, the 
cautious state of the international capital 
markets, and the political paralysis mentioned 
above. Throughout the 1890s, as a consequence 
of Portugal´s impasse with its external creditors, 
interested parties in both England and Germany 
imagined they would be able to purchase all or 
part of the Portuguese Empire. If we use the 
exchange rate as an indicator, the Portuguese 
situation deteriorated further after the departure 
of Oliveira Martins; the worst years for Portugal 
were also the worst years for Brazil, 1897 to 1900. 
After the latter year, as the Brazilian exchange 
revived, so did the Portuguese, approaching par 
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by 1905, the year before Brazil went on the gold 
standard (Mata, 1987, pages 52-53). During the 
nadir of the crisis, in 1898, the Germans and the 
British signed a secret treaty with one another 
that offered to lend money to Portugal on the 
guarantee of the African colonies and Timor 
and by which the two powers agreed which 
portions of the empire they would receive should 
Portugal default. In the minds of the negotiators 
were France´s annexation of Tunisia in 1881 
for failure to honor its debts as well as the more 
dramatic Anglo-French occupation of Egypt the 
following year for the same reason.
 In spite of this secret convention, the 
British authorities, once assured of the use of 
Lourenço Marques, proved more interested 
in limiting German expansion than acquiring 
Portuguese territory. Thus, with covert British 
assistance, Portugal arranged a bridge loan in 
France that year avoiding borrowing in either 
Germany or England and consequently pledging 
its colonies (Costa, 1998, 88). A year later, as 
the Boer War loomed, Portugal´s bargaining 
position improved. It reached an agreement with 
England confirming the use not only of Lourenço 
Marques but also of other ports in Mozambique 
by the British military and restored the “oldest 
alliance”. The German emperor´s pro-Boer 
stance, as well as his insistence on building his 
navy, separated him from England which found 
it worthwhile to defend Portugal from further 
German expansion.
With the recovery of the exchange, 
Portugal thought it expedient to sit down with 
the creditors. In 1902, the cabinet agreed to 
increase payments by about one third and won 
the grudging consent of the primarily British and 
French lenders (Mata, 1987, page 26). In fact, 
that year, the Portuguese government negotiated 
first in Paris with French, Belgian, and Dutch 
investors, and after the conclusion of this 
agreement, the government finally renegotiated 
with the British creditors led by the recovered 
Barings. In both cases, the Portuguese pledged 
their continental customs receipts, as did the 
Brazilians in 1898. Of great significance, the 
Portuguese did not have to pledge the receipts 
of their African colonies or their Atlantic islands. 
Germany, and to a lesser degree, France, still 
entertained the hope of acquiring part of the 
Portuguese empire (Costa, page 122). 
We have noted that Brazil´s external 
situation improved dramatically in the years 
following 1898 mirrored by events in the United 
States. While America almost departed the gold 
standard in 1893 and 1895 and nearly elected 
William Jennings Bryan president in 1896 on 
a platform of abandoning the gold standard, by 
1902, this now booming country had created an 
overseas empire by defeating Spain in 1898 and 
had become a creditor to Britain by helping to 
finance the Boer War. Whereas these countries, 
and many others, experienced prosperity from 
1898 to 1914, Portugal missed this opportunity. 
In 1902, emigrants´ remittances provided room 
to breathe, but the accompanying growth of 
exports never took place, aside from a modest 
expansion of sales to the African colonies. 
The traditional political parties had not taken 
advantage of the economic improvement to 
attempt any significant reforms and refused to 
share power with a developing lower middle 
class. After 1902, a reform-minded king became 
increasingly authoritarian in his frustration with 
the politicians. A serious republican opposition 
also appeared at this time to capture the obvious 
dissatisfaction of elements of the lower middle 
and the upper middle sectors (Valente, 1976). 
As late as 1902, neither royal dictatorship nor 
republican success were foregone conclusions.
Epilogue: Brazil, 1901-1914
The Rodrigues Alves government left 
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its mark on Brazil´s capital as it disposed of 
the resources to build many impressive official 
edifices as well as the new main avenue. In 1905, 
Rodrigues Alves completed the liquidation 
of the Banco da Republica, which had in fact 
functioned all of time since Murtinho took it 
over during the crisis of 1900. Capital in this 
institution, re-named the Banco do Brasil, was 
divided among the old shareholders, the state, 
which received a participation in return for 
its uncollectible loans, and new shareholders, 
who contributed cash. Since 1905, the Banco 
do Brasil has functioned as the state´s official 
commercial bank and fiscal agent. Industry grew, 
even without protectionist governments, to the 
point where Brazil had become self-sufficient in 
several light industries, especially in the textile 
sector. The milreis rose further, reaching 16d by 
the end of the Rodrigues Alves administration. 
Now the coffee planters began to see too much 
of a good thing. Their exports brought them ever 
less local currency, and the thought of a milreis 
at 27d proved entirely distasteful to them. To 
prevent the milreis from further appreciation, 
Brazil´s leaders resolved to go on the full gold 
standard. There took place a long discussion on 
what would be the best rate which President-
elect Afonso Pena settled by choosing 15d. In 
1906, Brazil went on the gold standard at this 
parity from which it increased to 16d a few years 
later. Brazil remained on the gold standard until 
the First World War (and briefly returned from 
1926 to 1930).
By 1906, with a new super-crop of 
coffee, Brazil threatened to supply more of 
the beverage than the world could consume. 
Rather than allow the price to fall, President-
elect Pena and the governors of the coffee 
producing states took advantage of Brazil´s 
strong credit to obtain foreign funding to take 
the excess off the market. Rothschilds declined 
to lend for this purpose, ending their tenure as 
Brazil´s banker. American banks stepped in with 
glee and provided the funds. The valorization 
scheme worked in the short run but failed over 
the longer term. The manipulation provided an 
incentive for Colombia and other competitors to 
increase their production. What the valorization 
demonstrated was that Brazil´s elite, rather than 
depending upon England or any other power, 
knew how to manipulate the financial system for 
their perceived benefit.
Epilogue: Portugal, 1902-1914
For much of the world, the years 1902 
through 1914 witnessed impressive economic 
growth lubricated by gold flowing from 
Alaska and British-controlled South Africa. 
As Brazil participated in this boom, immigrant 
remittances to Portugal attained new highs. 
Thanks to Portugal´s collaboration during the 
Boer War, as well as England´s preoccupation 
with an expansionist Germany, England visibly 
supported its oldest ally with a state trip by King 
Edward VII to Lisbon in 1904. Thus, two of the 
factors which had provoked the crisis in 1890 
had been resolved while two remained. By 1902, 
remittances contributed positively to the balance 
of payments even if some contemporaries saw the 
emigration of able bodied males as an obstacle to 
growth. And although the Ultimatum of 1890 left 
scars, King Edward´s trip went a good way to 
restoring King Carlos´ prestige while the Royal 
Navy came to be seen more as a guarantee than 
as a threat to the Portuguese Empire. The other 
two factors, the need to recover international 
markets for Portuguese goods and the lack of tax 
revenue to service the public debt, continued. The 
successive Portuguese governments´ failure to 
increase the efficiency of tax collection, improve 
the treatment of creditors, and resolve the 
country´s unfavorable trade balance contributed 
to Portugal´s inability to take advantage of the 
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global conjuncture.
Politics dominated events in Portugal 
during this period of mediocre growth. The 
consensus among the leading political parties 
to rotate in power appears to have broken down 
during the crisis and could not be restored during 
the first decade of the century. Facing increased 
criticism of the monarchy due the government´s 
inability to provide either economic growth 
or political reform, King Carlos assumed a 
progressively more authoritarian position, 
declaring a dictatorship in 1907. Early the next 
year, he and the crown prince were assassinated. 
In a further two years, the monarchy was 
overthrown. The new republic did not really 
consolidate itself by the time that World War I 
started, as it faced the same social, political, and 
economic difficulties that the monarchy did, 
often employing many of the same personnel.
Portugal´s disappointing performance 
from 1890 onwards cannot be blamed on 
dependence. The Portuguese made at least 
one disastrous and avoidable decision, the 
one regarding payment of the external and the 
internal debt. Other policies and practices such 
as meager investment in education or poor use 
of the colonies may also have contributed to an 
unsatisfactory experience. The breakdown of the 
political process, which no doubt had a major 
impact on economic growth, came from internal 
factors not unique to Portugal. In his classic, 
The Strange Death of Liberal England, George 
Dangerfield shows how even England appeared 
to be tearing itself to pieces in the years before 
the first war between the unions, the suffragettes, 
and the Irish.10 Portugal appeared unable to find 
a political consensus, either under the monarchy 
or under the republic, to include the new groups, 
especially the urban lower middle classes and 
the factory workers, that were thrown up by the 
success of the Regeneração. 
Final Remarks
To the extent that the elites of Portugal 
and Brazil did not do everything they wanted, 
their limitations arose from domestic causes: 
divisions within the elites or opposition 
from rising groups outside the elite. Foreign 
interference had little impact.
Here we have examined Portuguese and 
Brazilian policies regarding trade, currency, and 
public debt to demonstrate the limited British 
influence in these key areas. Only on two 
instances, using armed force, did Britain make 
its presence felt: in the 1840s, the Royal Navy 
invaded Brazilian waters to seize slave ships, 
and in the 1890s, the same Royal Navy assured 
English control of Rhodesia while protecting 
Mozambique from German ambitions. These 
exceptional actions proved the rule. 
Notes
1. Brazilian “Anais da Câmara de Depu-
tados”, August 30, 1848.
2. Schulz, 2013, pages 139-143. Gene-
rally, where there are various paragraphs without 
references, this is because I am based on my pu-
blications cited here.
3. Lains, 1995, page 36, notes that the 
Portuguese economy was among the most closed 
in Europe creating an obstacle to growth that ta-
riffs exacerbated.
4. Figueiredo, 1889, page 75.
5. Rio News, July 1, 1889.
6. Rio News, August 18, 1890.
7. Rio News, October 20, 1890
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8. Rio News, June 30, 1890.
9. Mata, 1987, pages 30 to 33 for all fi-
gures except for immigrants´ remittances which 
is my estimate.
10.        See also Powell, 1996.Rio News, 
June 30, 1890.
Mata, 1987, pages 30 to 33 for all figures 
except for immigrants´ remittances which is my 
estimate.
10.        See also Powell, 1996.
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